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Abstract 
 
A question how effective European Union Cohesion Fund and Structural Funds are in 
promoting economic growth and speeding up the process of convergence has attracted an 
interest of international community and a broad circle of scientists. While some authors claim 
that only for countries with the “right“ institutions these funds bring benefit, some research on 
international aid shows that financial assistance is likely to reduce quality of institutions in the 
recipient countries. This thesis is exploring how the absorption of EU Funds support and the 
quality of institutions in EU Member States affect each other by first measuring how great is 
the impact of public institutions quality on the EU Funds absorption (namely, the EU Funds 
actually received compared to the amount allocated) in a cross-country perspective, and then 
conducting informant interviews to find out possible effects of the EU funding (absorbed via 
EU co-financed projects) on institutional quality in the Member States. Study combines both 
quantitative and qualitative research methods thus showing that each additional increase in 
quality of public institutions raised absorption of EU funds by 0.59 in the scale, given 2007-
2013 EU Funds support period; but paradoxically EU funds just as other development aid 
were in a risk of legal corruption and similar practice, having negative effects on institutional 
quality, when EU-supported projects issue contracts for suppliers via public tendering. 
Results from the study can be beneficial for rethinking EU Funds management strategy and 
implications, and also contribute to the debate on overall impact of foreign aid interventions 
on the quality of government. 
 
Key words: EU regional and cohesion policy, EU funds absorption, EU co-financed 
projects, quality of institutions 
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1. Introduction  
 
In recent years, there has been a wide-ranging debate on the results of the European Union 
(EU) Structural and Cohesion assistance to the Member States. To begin with, EU Structural 
funds together with the Cohesion fund are the most intensively used policy instruments by the 
EU to promote economic growth as well as social development and to reduce welfare 
differences within the Member States.
1
 The EU Structural Funds contain almost 1/3 of EU 
budget and around 2/3 of Structural Funds money are granted for regions with GDP per capita 
less than 75% of the EU average (Becker et al., 2010). Since most of the countries with the 
mentioned GDP level are among the ones with the lowest Quality of Government
2
 (QoG), the 
European Commission decided that in order to receive financial assistance from the EU Funds 
the Member States are obligated to co-finance their regional projects, meaning that all the 
supporting payments from the EU are granted on specific conditions. This implies that the 
country’s institutional capacity to distribute, invest and absorb the EU grants efficiently has 
become an essential determinant of European cohesion process and has attracted 
considerations of the international scientific community.  
 
While a wide variety of literature is trying to answer a question how effective EU Funds are 
in promoting economic growth and speeding up the process of convergence, another piece of 
debate emphasize that only for countries with “right” institutions any international aid is 
effective
3
, what suggests that institutional quality is a foundation-stone for regional and 
cohesion aid effectiveness as well. According to Ederveen et al. (2002) study, the latter result 
is obtained for a wide range of conditioning variables, such as openness, institutional quality, 
low corruption and other indicators for good governance. However, there is also a substantial 
body of evidence found by scholars of the international aid, showing that foreign aid is in 
some cases likely to reduce quality of institutions in the recipient countries.  
 
                                                          
1 With this goal on mind, all Member States receive assistance from the EU Structural Funds to solve their social and 
economic problems in addition to promoting further development. There are several Structural funds, among which the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), started in 1975, is the largest. To strengthen and uphold EU‘s political and 
economic role in a global community, European Cohesion Policy was created. Only less developed regions are eligible to 
receive assistance from the Cohesion Fund. See: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index_en.cfm  
2 For the European Quality of Government index, see Charon et al. (2012) 
3 See for example Burnside and Dollar (2000), Ederveen et al., (2002), Collier and Dollar (2002) 
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On the EU level, a recent Transparency International Europe report on the EU Integrity 
System (2014) revealed that 70 % of EU citizens believe corruption as a signal of low QoG is 
strongly present in the EU system. Report also raised a concern that “the range of controls to 
prevent public money falling into the hands of corrupt individuals risks being undermined by 
the weak way in which the European Commission is currently using its powers to exclude and 
deter corrupt companies from participating in public tendering by EU institutions.” It is 
likely to be a case not only in the central institutions governing EU, but also in EU Member 
States, which receive extensive support from the EU Funds and are widely procuring products 
and services needed to implement EU-supported projects.  
 
Consequently, it might not only lead to inefficient use of EU budget, but also have the 
adverse effect on the process of convergence. This is why the aim of this paper is not to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the EU regional and cohesion policy (what is continuously done 
by different scholars and European Union institutions as well), but rather to analyze the 
relationship between the absorption of EU Funds assistance and the quality of public 
institutions in the EU Member States. This goal is to be reached in two ways: first, by 
measuring to what extent quality of public institutions matter for the absorption of EU Funds 
(in other words, the EU funding received in relation to the allocation planned), and then by 
conducting informants’ interviews in one of the EU Member States (Lithuania) to explore 
what effects EU funding absorbed (naturally, via EU co-financed projects) possibly have on 
the quality of public institutions. In this part, public procurement aspects analyzed in previous 
research are taken into consideration and tested. Institutions here are understood as formal and 
informal structures guiding the behavior of individuals involved in the implementation of EU 
Structural and Cohesion Funds programmes. 
 
Based on results from previous research on foreign aid as well as recent studies on 
relationship between EU Funds and legal corruption, hypothesis of this study is that quality of 
public institutions has a significant impact on the absorption of EU Funds, yet EU funded 
projects may also have side effects on the quality of institutions. If given the current strategy 
and policies the EU Funds aid indeed has more negative effect on institutional quality (while 
it is crucial to have good institutions in order to absorb aid), financial support in some cases 
could be self-destructive: funding might not only be absorbed in an inefficient way, but also 
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the goal of regional cohesion and development may be never reached. Consequently, it would 
be essential to reorganize the way assistance is managed or the way conditions for receiving it 
are set to avoid the paradox as the well-known “aid curse”, leading to the regression instead 
of development, and consequently to the divergence instead of convergence. This is a very 
relevant question since regional inequalities are/will be only increasing with the time in case 
EU structural and cohesion aid as it is and the way it is distributed now contribute to lower 
quality of institutions in the Member States. 
 
The results of this research are beneficial for further planning and implementation of 
Structural and Cohesion programmes for the new funding period 2014-2020, because there is 
still no cross-country research measuring how great is the impact of institutional quality for 
the EU Funds absorption by using the most recent data; and given that studies exploring not 
only positive, but also negative effects that the EU funding absorbed (via EU co-financed 
projects) have a potential to bring for the quality of institutions in the Member States are only 
emerging. Therefore, this paper provides new insights and extends current ideas about the 
twofold complex relationship between EU Structural and Cohesion aid and institutional 
quality. Furthermore, this study contributes to the discussion on international aid impact on 
the Quality of Government (QoG).  
 
1.1. Disposition 
 
The paper is structured as follows: the first chapter (theoretical part) consists of an overview 
of key arguments in the literature; the second chapter explains the research design. It is 
followed by two chapters of research where the hypotheses are assessed, each with 
methodological approach as well as analysis and results. Then, in the concluding discussion 
findings are summarized, conclusions are drawn from the empirical study and further research 
directions are offered.  
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2. Theoretical discussion 
 
Before the empirical part, earlier research around the question of concern is overviewed, to 
create a theoretical model and develop hypotheses of the study. This part will shed some light 
on how the institutional quality and EU funds absorptions can be understood, how 
international aid and institutional quality are related to each other, what is the role of 
institutional quality in absorption of the EU Funds and what institutional problems are 
noticed to occur around the EU-supported projects. 
 
2.1. Defining the institutional quality 
 
To begin with, institutionally oriented research is stressing the importance of institutions for 
development, by analyzing interaction between economic, social variables and institutional 
framework. According to the development economist Dani Rodrik, institutions can be 
described as  
“a regulatory apparatus curbing the worst forms of fraud, anti-competitive behavior, 
and moral hazard, a moderately cohesive society exhibiting trust and social cooperation, 
social and political institutions that mitigate risk and manage social conflicts, the rule of law 
and clean government” (Rodrik, 2007).  
 
In short, institutions in the framework of EU Funds can be understood as formal and informal 
structures which guide the behavior of individuals involved in the implementation of EU 
Structural and Cohesion Funds programmes. For instance, these are institutions managing EU 
Funds in each country as well as each local and regional public institution involved in EU 
Funded projects: including Ministries, Municipalities, other public and semi-public 
organizations. Meanwhile, the general government structure of a country models social 
behavior and creates perspective of collective action, determining sanctions and incentives, all 
with a goal of further development (Alonso and Garcimartin, 2009).  
 
Some authors provide evidence that institutional quality is a foundation stone in determining 
different level of development in societies and economies (Rothstein, 2008), but to 
understand this importance one has to know what is meant by the term quality of institutions 
first.  
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In particular, institutional quality is a concept which can be constrained from different 
ingredients and there is no prescription of it as a certain concrete norm. Thus, over the last 
years the scientific community has argued a lot about what can define and determine a good 
quality of institutions as precisely as possible, and the difficulty rests in the relative 
understanding of “good” and “bad” in every country or region, raising a question how can it 
be measured internationally.  
 
For example, it is an ongoing trend to include  measures for institutional quality such as 
favoritism and corruption, transparency of government policymaking, efficiency of 
bureaucracy, intellectual property protection, diversion of public funds, public trust in 
politicians, wastefulness of government spending, burden of government regulation, efficiency 
of legal framework in settling disputes and challenging regulations as well as government’s 
services for improved business performance (World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Report, 2012). These can go in line with determinants such as income 
distribution, development and education level, international openness and tax revenue 
(Alonso and Garcimartin, 2009). As some of these variables still can be understood 
differently in every country, there is an obvious need of adding a commonly understood norm 
characterizing institutional systems as it is clear that specific array of institutional settings 
cannot define the quality across the world. 
 
In order to make the definition more complete one has to recognize that a concept of 
institutional quality is very much linked to a quality of government (QoG), which can be in 
short defined as having impartial government institutions for the exercise of public power 
(Rothstein, 2011). One of the most frequently used definitions of good governance also 
includes the role of institutions and was given by the World Bank Research Institute 
(Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido-Lobatón, 1999):  
 
“The traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised, what 
makes the relationship between institutions and government clearer. This includes (1) the 
process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of 
citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among 
them).  
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From all the measures mentioned above, it is convincing enough that impartiality can be 
considered as the most important ingredient of what good quality of institutions can be, 
because it is understood similarly regardless economic performance or social, cultural 
differences (Rothstein, 2012). Hence, to capture the essence of concept more conscientiously, 
in this thesis definition of impartial, credible, transparent, incentive-compactible institutions 
with high level of adaptability, rule of law and effective bureaucracy, is considered 
capturing the institutional quality in the most complete manner. One can see that these aspects 
are based on the World Economic Forum description, merging some of its variables into one. 
 
In this thesis the term quality of institutions is intentionally used instead of its’ sibling quality 
of government (QoG), given that it is public and private institutions that in many levels 
implement EU-funded programmes and projects. However, considering these two close 
concepts: the government quality and institutional quality in the EU context, Dijkstra (2012) 
wrote that many of the EU countries are confronted with problems related to QoG, regardless 
the level of their development: “Some of the founding members and countries that joined the 
Union before 2004 still score poorly on several issues related to QoG.  Neither is low QoG 
limited to the less economically developed countries of the EU: some countries with a 
relatively high GDP per head still score low on several of the dimensions of QoG”. It raises a 
question if EU Funds aid interventions can in some way be affecting the QoG and separate 
institutions, as it is not the country’s initial economic development itself as a determinant, 
also if institutional quality matters at all for better absorption of EU financial commitments.  
 
2.2. Relationship between aid and institutional quality  
 
In the meantime, the academic debate has also provided diverse results on whether 
international aid has a positive impact on growth and the institutional development. For 
example, a research by Svensson (2000) found that foreign aid is to a large extent associated 
with higher levels of corruption due to increased rent seeking activities in aid recipient 
countries. Likewise, Rajan and Subramanian (2008) study revealed the negative effect of aid 
on institutional quality in developing countries. Authors used the International Country Risk 
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Guide for measuring the quality of institutions and found that coefficient on the aid-policy 
interaction terms is significant, yet never is positive.  
 
Additionally, even though international aid has quite often been used as a tool for 
encouraging democracy, Djankov et al. (2008) found that higher levels of foreign aid actually 
harm a recipient’s political institutions instead of strengthening it. Similarly, Heckelman and 
Knack (2008), Knack (2001) analyzed aid’s impact on economic institutions and found that 
instead of fostering marked orientated form, international financial assistance is disturbing it.  
 
Young (2012) contributed to this debate by showing that aid distributions are linked to 
decreased property rights and the legal structure of a recipient nation; which are, in turn, 
correlated with growth. In particular, his estimations revealed that, via its negative effect on 
legal structure and property rights, a standard deviation increase in aid leads to a 2.3% 
decrease in the recipient country’s rate of income growth per capita. Even his control for 
foreign aid interventions only as an additional (to institutional quality) determinant of growth, 
the expected effect of aid is proved to be still negative. Author emphasized that if controlling 
aid effects on institutional quality, it is not at all associated with higher growth rates.  
 
On the EU level, studies focusing on interaction between institutional quality and absorption 
of aid from the EU Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund are still in its infancy. One of the 
most recent and relevant studies by Fazekas et al (2013) finds a significant impact of EU 
financial assistance on institutionalized grand corruption in public procurement during 2009-
2012 in three countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. This is one of the problems 
(arguably) increasing in the framework of the EU Funds’ investments. More on this and other 
institutional problems are to be discussed in 2.5. part of this theoretical discussion, where 
problems and mechanisms of how aid can weaken institutions are discussed in more detail. 
 
Literature discussed here raises a question if effect of EU financial support on institutional 
development could be similar as in studies focusing on other development aid. It is very 
important gap in the literature of European Regional and Cohesion aid issues as there is a 
growing scholarly consensus on why institutional factors are important for better absorption 
of aid, thus studies exploring interaction between the absorption of EU funds financial 
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assistance and the institutional quality in recipient countries are only emerging. To fill this 
gap, this study aims to explain how absorption of the EU Funds support and institutional 
quality in the Member States affect each other. 
 
It is thus essential to clearly understand why quality of public institutions plays a role for 
reaching the goals of EU regional and cohesion policies first. To explain it, one needs to start 
by looking closer to the main measure of the EU funding received – the EU Funds absorption 
rate. 
 
2.3. Defining the EU Funds absorption 
 
In perspective of EU Funds assistance, a measure of the EU Funds budget received in 
proportion to the available aid allocation is the EU funds’ absorption rate, which is widely 
used in studies analyzing EU assistance. It shows how much of financial support (allocated 
via EU Structural and Cohesion funds) the EU Member State has actually received, and this 
expenditure is expressed as percentage of the total amount of money allocated.  
 
Absorption rate = 
                       
                         
 *100% 
 
The absorption rate is a unique characteristic which also does not require constraining 
additional proportions as amount of money received to the size of GDP or government 
budget, as these are already taken into consideration when planning EU Funds allocations. 
Measure is also renewed every quarter, allowing to trace the progress of receiving planned 
funding until the end of funding period. 
 
To be more explicit about this measure, a certain amount of money is allocated to every 
Member State in the beginning of funding period, given country’s development needs and 
macroeconomic capacities. This does not mean that the allocated budget is directly 
transferred to respective Funds managing authorities in each Member State, but it rather is a 
maximum amount of budget which from country can potentially fund its drafted projects. As 
an example, allocation from EU Structural and Cohesion Funds to Romania to use during 
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2007-2013 funding period was 19 213 mln. €4, and it was a budged on which EU agreed 
already before 2007. However, only 45.2 % of this amount was actually paid to Romania until 
the end of 2013. Here, 45.2 % is a measure showing percentage of EU Funds allocated per 
Member State actually paid by the Commission, or the so-called Funds absorption rate. It 
shows how much money country received and invested via EU co-financed projects based on 
various priorities, out of the maximum amount which was planned to transfer by EU. This 
measure is well linked to the EU-funded projects’ management level, explaining how well 
country was been able to implement projects, as EU assistance is received by co-financing 
projects from EU Structural and Cohesion Funds’ programmes on different priorities. This for 
example means that in Romania only 45.2 % of the planned budget was actually received.  
 
As EU Funds absorptions is very sensitive to country’s institutional capacities, already in 
1997 scholars started analyzing why this rate is usually not high: “the absorption of EU 
commitments by the Member States for instance was in some cases rather low, which has 
been blamed partly on the lack of efficiency of the national administrations” (Tsoukalis, 
1997). EU commitments here are understood as financial allocations via EU Funds to the EU 
Member States.  
 
As a case, in theory low absorption of such funding is heavily blamed on administrative 
factors: inability of local public and private institutions to distribute and invest by planning, 
implementing and managing EU-funded projects. And further, scientific studies emphasize 
the presence of a direct causality between low EU funds absorption and the uneven 
development of EU regions
5
. To develop a further analysis, the next part of this paper digs 
into why institutional factors matter for the absorption of the EU Funds assistance. 
 
2.4. Importance of the institutional quality for the EU Funds 
absorption 
 
Talking about institutions in the framework of EU Funds management, both formal and 
informal institutions are particularly important because they help countries to both “adjust 
                                                          
4
 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/thefunds/funding/index_en.cfm  
5
 See for example Opritescu Elena Madalina (2012), Evaluation of the Structural Funds absorption rates by 
means of HERMIN Model 
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and react to change by generating a substantial degree of adaptive efficiency, which 
highlights the capacity and willingness of domestic actors to adopt and promote new 
knowledge, to engage in creative and innovative activities” (North, 1990)6. In attempt to 
explore the causes of the relatively limited returns of development aid across different regions 
around the world and in the EU, increased attention has been paid to estimate the influence of 
institutions on development, not only from the economic perspective. In terms of economic 
integration, its’ impact on regional growth is strongly dependent on the regional ability to 
compete successfully in order to benefit from open markets. While more regions with more 
competitive advantages are expected to benefit more from economic integration, less 
advanced ones may even experience a net loss (Petrakos, 2012; Kallioras and Petrakos, 2010).  
 
As an argument in favor of institutional quality bringing added value for absorption of 
development aid, endogenous growth theory (Romer 1986, 1990) considers that positive and 
long-term effects from aid are possible only given certain focus. Namely, in case the regional 
economic or political interventions promote research and technical development (R&D), in 
addition to public, human and social capital. Following that, the research on variables such as 
trust (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Knack, 2003; Beugelsdijk et al., 2004; Bengtsson et al., 2005) 
and social capital (Putnam, 2000; Beugelsdijk and van Schaik, 2005) has flourished, leading 
some scholars to recognize and felicitate the new “kid on the block” – institutions. It was 
stated then, that institutions matters as much, if not more, for political, social and economic 
development than traditional, long-established settings like technology transfers, human and 
physical resource endowments and trade (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004).  
 
Since then, the impact of the EU Structural Funds on the growth rate (and variables related to 
it) in EU Member States and the interaction terms with institutional variables turned to the 
center of attention of various studies (Katsaitis and Doulos, 2009; Ederveen et al., 2002; 
Ederveen et al., 2006). Reviewing the most significant results of the research, studies state 
that institutional factors have a major influence for the effectiveness of funding. For example, 
using country-level data some recent studies investigated whether the impact of Structural 
Funds payments is dependent on institutional settings of the country (Ederveen et al., 2006; 
Bähr, 2008). One on the most concrete explanations was given by Rodriguez-Pose (2010):  
                                                          
6
 Cited in Rodriguez-Pose (2010) 
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“If a) the returns of the European regional development effort since the reform of the Structural Funds 
are controversial and contested; if b) researchers are finding that institutions matter more and more for 
economic growth and development; and if c) European development strategies have, by and large, overlooked 
the institutional dimension, ergo institutions matter for regional economic development in the EU and therefore 
should become an essential part of the European regional development effort in order to improve its 
effectiveness. It's the institutions, stupid!” 
 
A good contribution to the debate on institutions affecting the absorption efficiency of 
development aid is provided by Olsson and Ahlerup (2009) who analyze how growth is 
influenced by investment in social capital and in formal institutions. Their research proves 
that countries with low levels of institutional quality have the most to obtain from social 
capital improvement, while countries with low social capital can benefit the most from better 
formal institutional quality instead. This idea is also supported by Grootaert (2001), as well as 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004), who show that social capital matters less for the non-
poor than the poor.  
 
In the scope of EU regional development programmes and given that to reach the higher 
funds’ absorption the possible is one of the top priorities for every Member State, it feels 
important to remember the three aspects influencing it (NEI, 2002): 
1. Macroeconomic factors, representing a percentage of EU transfers in relation to the 
national economic performance. The more transfers in comparison to national 
performance exists, the less is the number of effective investment possibilities for EU 
funded projects in the country. Transfers therefore currently are limited to 3.8% of GDP in 
every country respectively. 
2. Financial factors, expressing country’s own ability to co-finance projects supported by 
EU money. 
3. Institutional factors, representing the ability of public institutions to administrate, 
manage and supervise funding between local organizations and the European 
Commission. The absorption rate measure is therefore very sensitive to institutional 
quality, as administrative factors are essential for better absorption.  
 
In this thesis, implications of macroeconomic and financial factors are not further analyzed, 
as it is in a great focus of various economically oriented studies over the years of EU Funds 
aid presence. On the contrary, institutional factors have been neglected until the recent years 
and it is therefore in the main scope of this thesis.  
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Yet literature discussed in 2.2. part suggests that aid is in many cases harming the government 
settings in recipient countries, which then might lead to increasing inequalities within the EU 
countries instead of reaching its’ main goal – to reduce welfare differences and increase 
cohesion within the EU countries. This question is in a great need to be answered by new, 
extensive research, especially because even though funding from the EU has had a positive 
effect on growth, a wide spectrum of research (Canova, 2004; Petrakos et al., 2005, Vojinović 
and Próchniak, 2009; Artelaris et al., 2010) and examination of regional data shows that 
inequalities between regions of the EU are actually increasing, followed by some institutional 
problems. 
 
2.5. Institutional problems raising around the EU-funded 
projects 
 
Here, some evidence on the side effects of the EU funded projects for different institutional 
structures in aid recipients (EU Member States) is discussed.  
2.5.1. Promotion of “institutional sclerosis” and institutionalized grand 
corruption 
To start with, institutionally thin environments, such as less developed EU Member States, 
often end up dominated by elites in what Olson (1982) called “institutional sclerosis”. This 
process is interrupting struggles of sustainable development in a way that Structural Funds 
payments may provide comfortable opportunities for rent seeking by public administrative 
bodies on both regional and national level (Ederveen et al., 2006). This means that public 
officials can be involved in a decision-making process based on partnership in order to 
allocate financial transfers in a ways that would pursue their own interests and strategies in 
the first place (Katsaitis and Doulos, 2009). It implies partiality when defining the directions 
of national development, specification of the projects’ targets and choosing suppliers.  
It is basically the same context as of the previously mentioned “institutional sclerosis”, 
which tends to spread distrust and dissatisfaction in the local public policy-making process 
and, most importantly, drives local responsible actors away from the development process 
(Rodriguez-Pose, 2010). This, in turn, contributes to creation of a downward spiral of 
remarkable underdevelopment in Member States.  
16 
 
 
Considering most recent studies on this matter, findings of the Transparency International 
Europe report on the EU Integrity System (2014) revealed that 70 % of EU citizens believe 
corruption is strongly present in the EU system. It also pointed into flaws in the public 
procurement practice under EU funded projects, where the possibility of rent-seeking and 
corrupt behavior is relatively high:  
“The Commission has discretionary powers to exclude (or ‘debar’) companies for 
'grave professional misconduct', yet only one was excluded for this reason at the time of 
writing. Moreover, only six entities were debarred for convictions of fraud, corruption, 
money-laundering or involvement in a criminal organisation, raising questions on how well 
member states and the Commission are sharing relevant information.”  
 
Some of the most striking results on this matter come from a recent study on EU Funds 
fuelling corruption in Central and Eastern Europe by Fazekas et al (2013),  who were using 
data on the individual public procurement transactions a unique database on public 
procurement in Slovakia, Hungary and Czech Republic calculate a composite corruption risks 
indicator. Their preliminary findings indicate that EU funds impact institutionalized grand 
corruption:  
“First, by providing additional public resources available for corrupt rent extraction; 
second, by changing the motivations for and controls of corruption for the additional 
resources. Preliminary calculations indicate that the first effect increases the value of 
particularistic resource allocation by up to 1.21% of GDP, while the second effect decreases 
it by up to 0.03% of GDP”.  
 
Also, author presents an innovative way to explore the cases of institutionalized legal 
corruption by analysis the process of awarding public procurement contracts, which can be 
applied in all Member States. In the research done, analysis of bypassing procurement 
competition in foreseen to have three primary forms, each corresponding to a phase of the 
public procurement process:  
 
1. Limiting the set of bidders: submission phase;  
2. Unfairly assessing bidders: assessment phase; and  
3. Ex-post modifying conditions of performance: delivery phase.  
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Most importantly, the author was able to control for and compare between EU funded and 
non-funded public procurement contracts. This omits the drawback of other scientists’ 
approaches where one could argue that procurement under EU funded projects depends on the 
initial corruption in overall procurement setting in a given country.  
 
Likewise, some scholars found that more corrupt EU countries tend to spend more 
investments on various abstract fixed assets projects other than improvement of concrete 
services, ex. health services, efficiency of which is easier to measure. On the left we see that 
greater government investments in capital formation (consisting of “outlays on additions to the 
fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. Fixed assets include land improvements 
(fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, 
railways, and the like, including <…> commercial and industrial buildings."
7
) are related to weaker 
control of corruption, whereas governments investing more in exact services such as health 
sector improvements tend to control the corruption more efficiently. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 1. Project spending and corruption vs health expenditure and corruption 
(Miungiu-Pippidi, 2013) 
 
Paradoxically, the report on the EU Integrity System (2014) also found a lack of common 
integrity and transparency rules in the EU institutions themselves. As one case of the point, 
information on the expenses of individual MEPs is not made public by the EP, meaning that 
                                                          
7
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.GDI.TOTL.ZS  
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there is “the lack of common integrity rules for representatives from national authorities 
when exercising functions at the EU level”. On the Member States level, information 
management in the process of implementing the EU funds projects it has a lot of formal, 
binding requirements for publicity with a goal of transparency and public awareness on how 
the financial support is used, thus there is not much evidence if the required publicity was 
enough to reach citizens. 
  
2.5.2. Political instability 
In addition to what has been discussed, in some Eastern Europe countries political parties 
started to compete over who is more efficient manager and better administrator of the EU 
funding rather than over the existing content of public policy. Such a competition was 
intensive in Hungary and Poland, where ex-communist parties began using these claims for 
their own competitive advantage (Grzymala-Buse and Innes, 2006). Author points that in 
countries with relatively worse economic and political conditions for reforms which were 
needed to receive funding from the EU, nationalism and populism has been used as a strategy 
by competing politicians. It only furthered the opportunities for rent seeking at the cost of 
efficient distribution of the public goods. According to this study, corruption, trivial disputes 
between political actors, personal competence and property restitution emerged in the center 
of country leaders’ attention, whereas the core public policy issues that were important for 
building up a strong state remained stagnant. Consequently, this kind of practice destabilized 
electorate’s sense of agency. In addition, persistent battles between political elites had done 
little to promote stable partisanship or at least increase respect for the government, it rather 
escalated into further destabilization of region
8
.  
 
Talking about analysis of effective use of the EU Funds, last year the European Commission 
released the report Cohesion policy: Strategic report 2013 on programme implementation 
2007-2013. It named not only administrational capacity, but also political stability as one of  
important obstacles in implementing cohesion programs: “an underlying lack (or even 
decline) in administrative capacity, <…> changes in legislation, inconsistent political 
                                                          
8
 Surprisingly, it was initially assumed that the enlargements of the EU are going to stabilize the Balkan region in 
the same way as it has stabilized Portugal and Spain. (Kun-Buczko, 2004). 
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ownership (changes in national and regional government, changes to institutions) and the 
effects of national sectoral reforms”. Additionally, a quantitative study of Italy revealed that 
political stability was to a great extent related to public institutions ability to contribute to the 
greater absorption of EU Funds (Milio, 2008). There, lack of political stability demolished 
coherent coordination needed for long-term planning and implementation of EU Funds 
programmes.  
 
Some other studies show that at the national level, institutional factors are related not only to 
the stability and professionalism of public institutions, but the structure of political system 
(federal versus central) as well (Zaman and Georgescu, 2009, Bähr, 2008). This might also 
explain why even in countries (or regions) with similarly developed institutions, absorption 
rates are not the same.  
 
Summing up, although scholars are considering why institutional factors are important for 
better absorption of aid, there is still no cross-country study estimating the extent to which 
quality of public institutions can foster absorption of the EU Funds. It is very important gap in 
the literature of European Regional and Cohesion aid issues which needs to be filled, also by 
taking into account other explanatory variables such as political stability and structure of the 
political system. 
 
2.5.3. Convergence or divergence? 
In addition to what has been discussed, public institutions had to develop many new features 
in order to receive and absorb EU Funds more efficiently, including training new staff, 
developing management systems. At the national level EU assistance pushed for many 
changes and expanded investment possibilities and economic development the way it would 
not be possible without the EU aid. The weighted coefficient of variation of regional GDP per 
capita has increased in most EU countries during the last decade, but despite that regional 
inequalities also have increased since introduction of the EU Funds. Inequalities are measured 
at the NUTS
9
 II or the NUTS III level, and show a decreasing trend (Petrakos, 2012). 
 
                                                          
9
 A Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) is instrumental tool used in the European Union's Structural 
Fund delivery mechanisms http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/introduction  
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Additionally, income levels variation between EU regions seems to be also increasing at the 
European scale. “Although in terms of GDP per capita the top 10 European NUTS II regions 
have improved their comparative position, during the same period European bottom10 
regions have faced a relative decline. Progress is made at both ends of the European scale, 
yet success is more obvious in the leading regions, rather than in the less developed ones” 
(Petrakos, 2012). This result could be explained by various causes. According to Petrakos 
(2012), one of the reasons (but not the only one) is that regional policies are not only 
designed, but also implemented badly and this is mostly caused by centralized and space-
blind delivery system in regions, which is limiting the ability to correctly respond to regional 
problems. Researcher emphasizes that cases of policy failure, where the identification and 
prioritization of regional goals and needs, the proposed policies and their implementation 
have been altogether inappropriate, are quite common. Those badly designed and 
implemented regional policies is a chronic problem that is usually not related to the available 
resources level, but rather to the management mechanisms and planning cultures that 
dominate in different places. According to this study, problem is even more serious in 
constantly underperforming regions, where traditional policy prescriptions usually do not 
work. Hence, those regions in which policies are more problematic to implement are also the 
ones that need positive changes in their development the most. One can also remember here 
that there is a direct causality between the uneven development of EU regions and low 
absorption of EU funding. 
 
This short overview of increased inequalities highlights the need for better understanding of 
what have caused them, despite the fact that so much effort and budget of the EU has been 
vastly spent on regional cohesion. Overall, there are different views on the EU Regional and 
Cohesion policies both in the EU reports and academic literature. Summing up the examples 
of the institutional problems (arguably) raising from the EU funded projects, it is important to 
emphasize that EU funding absorbed by the Member States is not the only reason for the 
higher or lower institutional quality within the EU countries. This study does not have the 
intention nor to claim so, neither to test if EU funding is the only reason contributing to the 
problems mentioned. The evidence collected has rather raised the question to which extent 
institutional quality is capable of fostering the level of EU Funds absorption. Likewise, it 
feels necessary to see if EU Funds, all of which are absorbed via EU co-financed projects, in 
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turn might have not only positive, but also negative impact for the institutional quality within 
the Member States, as then it may not only be problematic to efficiently use funding, but also 
lead to further increase of inequalities between more advanced and lagging regions of EU.  
 
These two questions go hand in hand in exploring the twofold relationship between quality of 
public institutions and the absorption of EU Funds assistance, as the overall picture of this 
complex relationship would not be complete if one of the questions was left unanswered. By 
presenting research on these matters, this study will also bring implications for further 
strategy of EU funding and will leave space for discussion if EU should continue providing 
aid the same way, or maybe even do something else to enhance the prosperity levels in the 
Member States. 
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3. Research design  
 
As it was already stated, the aim of this paper is not to evaluate the effectiveness of the EU 
regional and cohesion policy, but rather to understand the relationship between the 
absorption of EU Funds assistance and the quality of public institutions. To undercover this 
complex relationship, this research aims to answer two questions:  
 
Question 1: To what extent does institutional quality matter for the absorption of EU 
Funds support?  
                                                
 
Answering the first question requires measuring the size of effect by analyzing concrete data 
and numbers. Therefore, a quantitative approach is chosen, namely conducting multivariate 
OLS regression on EU level, which exactly measures to what extent public institutions’ 
quality can foster absorption of EU Funds aid. 
 
Question 2: What impact does EU Funds assistance absorbed possibly have on the quality 
of public institutions? 
                                    
                                             
    
The second question is descriptive and trying to undercover the possible effects EU funding 
absorbed (via EU co-financed projects) has for the institutional quality, and here the 
qualitative approach is chosen, namely conducting informant interviews in one of EU Member 
States, Lithuania. Data for analysis is drawn from interviews with experts who work/have 
been working with EU funded projects and their procurement from several sectors, and 
bringing their experience into the light.  
 
Justification of the choice of different methods 
One can misunderstand why different methods are used to answer each of the research 
questions raised.  Before describing the methods in detail, it is therefore important to justify 
the idea of applying both quantitative and qualitative approach in the same study.  
EU Funds absorption  Institutional quality 
EU Funds absorbed Institutional quality 
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To begin with, the goal of this study, which is to understand the twofold relationship between 
EU Funds aid absorption and the quality of public institutions, is reached by answering two 
research questions that were stated before. These questions require variant approaches in 
order to make fruitful analysis and draw reasonable results. For instance, to fully answer the 
second question, regression analysis would not bring similar results as it does for the first 
question. Unfortunately, it would be almost impossible to apply any methods/techniques of 
the quantitative approach for the second question due to lack of data on every Member State, 
and especially on variables of EU funds assistance that could be influential. The only way to 
still do it without changing the method would have been to analyze a public procurement 
database of a chosen country as Fazekas et al (2013) did, what would require in the first place 
building up the database from raw data files using data-mining techniques and special crawler 
algorithms. This would be exceeding time given for this paper, even though I have contacted 
the European Commission on this matter and received raw data files
10
 on at least Lithuanian 
public procurement under bigger EU funded projects. Nevertheless, it seemed beyond the 
scope of this study to work with such data, and actually the approach of analyzing EU Funds 
impact on public institution via public procurement data still would not bring people’s 
experience from the field into the daylight. In fact, it may also have high risk to be misleading 
due to the long standing traditions and shades of public procurement regardless the existence 
of EU Funds. It is however recommendable track for future research on the topic. 
Consequently, only qualitative approach is a way to move forward to answering the second 
research question by capturing experts’ experience and providing lively analysis of it; but to 
have a stronger focus and not exceed time and space given for thesis, only one country 
(Lithuania) was chosen for analysis.  
 
As choosing a certain method is a matter of research question, it was decided to take a risk of 
changing the methods to have a complete picture of the relationship analyzed and reach the 
goal of the study. However, both approaches chosen are different only in style, not in 
quality. Likewise, the benefit of combining two methods is that paper represents findings 
from both data analysis and experts’ experience, making this study a unique conjunction of 
qualitative and quantitative research and hence showing a complete picture of the topic.  
                                                          
10
 Containing more than 43.000 public procurement contracts and approximately 16 variables on each of them, and being raw 
data with strong need to review each case before working with it. 
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4. To what extent does institutional quality matter for the 
absorption of EU Funds aid? 
4.1. Method 
Literature discussed in 2.4. part suggests that institutional quality along with macroeconomic 
and financial factors have an impact on EU funds absorption capacity. There were also 
intriguing yet small quantitative studies represented, showing that political stability and 
political system sometimes plays a role in public institutions readiness and capacity to 
contribute to more effective use of EU funding (p.18-19). Still, there is no cross-country study 
on this matter. Accordingly, this part is meant to estimate to what extent quality of public 
institutions matter for the EU funds absorption (namely, the EU funds received in 
proportion to EU funds allocated). Following this idea, there are two hypotheses:  
 
H1. Quality of public institutions has a significant effect on EU Funds absorption 
rates in the EU Member States  
 
H0. Quality of public institutions doesn’t have any significant effect on EU Funds 
absorption rates in the EU Member States 
 
To perform analysis, a method that works the best at explaining phenomenon given these 
hypotheses and problem’s formulation is needed. As there is data on every EU country’s 
institutional quality, EU Funds absorption rates and similar variables, the multivariate OLS 
regression method will be applied on EU (cross-country) level. The scope of data is 27 EU 
Member States (Croatia, being the 28
th
 Member State is not included because it entered the 
EU only in 2013), taking into account the 2007-2013 funding period.  As there is data on EU 
Funds absorption rates only for the overall period, it is unfortunately not possible to conduct a 
time-series analysis.  
 
To be more precise about the chosen method, regression analysis is a statistical tool widely 
used for exploring relations between set of variables, therefore it is expected to be suitable 
here the best. Likewise, OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) multivariate regression is a technique 
allowing additional variables to enter the analysis and estimate effect of each (Tabachnick and 
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Fidell, 2001). A chosen regression model is multivariate, as level of EU Funds absorption 
may have more than one cause. Typically, the OLS technique produces easily interpretable 
results from both small and big data sets. The multivariate OLS regression method is chosen 
due to its’ capability of exactly measuring the impact of institutional quality on the absorption 
rates whilst producing quantitative information for analysis, to answer the first research 
question. 
 
Nevertheless, this method needs to be applied with cautiousness, as there are several pitfalls 
on a way. First of all, the method is very sensitive to outliers and can perform very badly if 
they are not identified. Indeed, the problem of outliers haunts not only the OLS regression, 
but also other types, both linear and non-linear regressions (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). 
Another important thing is that many relationships between variables are non-linear, whereas 
this method is mainly applicable for linear relationships. There are more matters of concern, 
such as wrong choice of variables, multicollinearity and similar issues, that need to be 
checked before analyzing results.  
 
4.2. Operationalization of variables 
 
Based on the hypotheses raised in order to estimate to what extent quality of public 
institutions matter for the EU funds absorption, the following variables were chosen.  
 
4.2.1. Dependent variable 
 
The overall percentage of funds allocated per Member State paid by the Commission (the so-
called funds absorption rate) is chosen as a dependent variable for analysis. 
  
Absorption rate = 
                       
                         
 *100% 
 
Variable is expressed in the percentage from 1 to 100%, where 45.2 % (Romanian rate) is the 
lowest and 84.5 % (Estonian) is the highest rate. European Commission updates absorption 
rates every quarter and the newest update was released on 15/04/2014, representing the 
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overall 2007-2013 funding period. Unfortunately, it is not a time-series data, but rather an 
overall rate for all the 2007-2013 programming period. The variable is recoded to scale from 
1 to 10 instead of 1 to 100.  
 
Undoubtedly, as an alternative path one could possibly use the data on amount of budget 
received in proportion to the GDP of country or size of government budget, yet the variable 
funds absorption rate is more suitable here for two reasons. Firstly, it automatically includes 
macroeconomic and financial measures in the proportion, as allocated budget is decided on 
considering these aspects given that they are essential for measuring countries’ development 
needs and tracing the progress later on. Secondly, the amount of budget received would not be 
able to have a link to the effectiveness of public administration to draft and implement 
projects in any other proportion than to the funding allocated, whereas the absorption rate 
does. Additionally, it is the absorbed funding, and not the allocated one, which is in need to 
be analyzed, what makes a link to the second part of this study more logical (as the effect of 
the EU funding actually absorbed is representing public institutions’ capacity to draft and 
implement EU-funded projects, managers of which are later interviewed). It would also make 
no sense to use the amount of allocations instead of absorption rates variable as it is not be 
money that country got but the money that were available for the given country to use, hence 
it is unpredictable in advance to know how much of the planned money country would use.  
 
One could be willing to check here if the greater budget reaches countries with the lowest 
QoG rates, to see if institutional quality factor is taken into consideration when planning EU 
Funds allocations. Nevertheless, if we remember Dijkstra (2012), who found that low QoG is 
not limited to the less economically developed countries of the EU, as some countries with a 
relatively high GDP per head still score low on several of the dimensions of QoG, and given 
that EU Funds aid goes more intensively to the less developed EU countries with GDP per 
capita less than 75 % of EU average, this approach becomes not theoretically convincing for 
further analysis. Moreover, both research questions of this thesis are strongly focused on the 
implementation and management of EU Funds’ investments, not just the budget planning 
level.  
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4.2.2. Explanatory variables 
 
Independent variable 1: Public institutions score from the World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Report (2012) dataset. As public institutions are a key management body of 
EU Funds and many of EU-funded projects, the public institutions quality score is chosen as 
an independent variable. It captures the public institutions quality instead of a broader concept 
the quality of government, and it is chosen intentionally. Institutional quality is a bit more 
narrow concept and having closer relationship with EU Funds management, as there are many 
public, semi-public and even private institutions involved in EU funded projects, which not 
necessary are country’s government bodies. However the concepts are very close as discussed 
in the theoretical part. 
 
Score is expressed from 1 to 7, 1 being the lowest quality of institutions. The Global 
Competitiveness Report portraits various aspects of country’s economic environment and 
potential to achieve proper prosperity and growth. Economic Forum Global Competitiveness 
Index for Public institutions part is determined by: 1.02 Intellectual property protection 1.03 
Diversion of public funds 1.04 Public trust in politicians 1.05 Irregular payments 1.06 
Judicial 1.07 Favoritism in decisions of government officials 1.08 Wastefulness of 
government spending 1.09 Burden of government regulation 1.10 Efficiency of legal 
framework in settling disputes 1.11 Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regs1.12 
Transparency of government policymaking 1.13 Gov’t services for improved business 
performance. The World Economic Forum data is collected from international organizations, 
national sources and its own annual Executive Opinion Survey. This variable is believed to 
capture aspects of public institutions efficiency important for effective management of EU 
funding. 
 
Independent variable 2: Political stability (from World Bank World Governance Indicators 
project, 2012). The project reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for 215 
economies over the 1996–2012 period for six dimensions of governance. This variable is 
added as an additional independent one, because there is some literature suggesting that 
political stability also matters for better absorption of EU Funds (see p.18). Of course, the 
first independent variable is still the only one essential for answering the research question, 
but it was decided to not exclude possibility of other variables being more significant in 
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explaining the dependent variable. Political Stability combines several indicators which 
measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or 
overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence 
and terrorism. Variable is expressed in ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong).  To proceed, 
this variable is recoded to scale from 1 to 5. One could argue that in EU context 
destabilization of government by unconstitutional means is not very common. Indeed, it 
would have been more convincing to use a variable capturing for example a consistency of 
the political ownership, but there is no such variable available. However, there definitely is 
variation in the chosen variable if one compares data from 2007 and 2012: 
 
 
Illustration 2. Political stability in Europe: 2007 compared to 2012 
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Control variable: Structure of political system (federal or not), from QoG standard dataset, 
where 1=federal, 0=other. This variable is chosen as a control one according to sources 
stating that federal versus central structure of political system also matters for absorption of 
EU funds (see p.19). 
 
4.3. Analysis and results 
 
Frequency distribution. To begin with, a frequency distribution of the dependent variable 
was checked. In a normal distribution both skewedness and kurtosis values are 0. Kurtosis 
value (-0,33) of the dependent variable is just slightly below 0 (if it was more negative one 
could indicate that a distribution is relatively flat, meaning that there are too many cases in the 
extremes). According to the histogram (see Annex 1), frequency distribution is just slightly 
skewed to the left, however almost perfectly bell-shaped, therefore the variable is not log-
transformed. 
Normality. While running regressions, residuals against the predicted values (using 
standardized predicted values (ZPRED) on the X axis and standardized residuals (ZRESID) in 
a plot on the Y axis) were considered. It showed that any of the OLS-regression assumptions 
are violated, because there was no clear or systematic pattern to residuals. Also, none of 
standardized residual values exceed 3.3 or is less than -3.3 in the scatterplots, meaning that 
there were no outlying residuals. Additionally, the Mahalanobis distances check did not show 
any leverage problems. The Normal Probability Plot indicated no major deviations from 
normality as well, since all points lied in a reasonably straight line (see Annex 1). Considering 
these results, there were no unusual cases concerning the output. 
 
Outliers. Since multiple regressions are very sensitive to outliers, check of every variable 
revealed no extreme outliers. As a case, countries having the highest absorption rate or the 
lowest absorption rate do not differ a lot from the remaining cluster of scores (see Annex 1), 
therefore they were not a matter of concern. Hence, those countries that are very good in 
absorbing EU Funds and the ones where absorption is considerably low are an interesting 
source for case studies, especially counties that are able to receive most of the funding despite 
the low institutional capacity, such as Greece, Portugal or Lithuania.  
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Multicollinearity. To check the presence of multicollinearity, the tolerance and VIF scores 
were checked. As we see, the variance inflation factor value is not above 5, and tolerance 
value is not below .20, therefore we have not violated the multicollinearity assumption. 
Moreover, correlations between DV and IVs do not show any problem (no correlations above 
0.8, and strength of the relationships are only very weak, weak or moderate), see Annex 1. 
 
Regression results. Regressions are conducted in a sequential order and results are put results 
to the regression table, starting with the bivariate regression results followed by more 
elaborative models. Information about the incepts/constants, the standard errors, the amount 
of explained variance (R2), including the number of cases and significance measures. 
Table 2. OLS regressions.  
The effect of public institutions quality on the absorption of EU funds 
DV: EU funds absorption (1-10) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  (bivariate) (two IVs) (three IVs) 
Public institutions (1-7) .59** .53* .56* 
 
(.20) (.22) (.23) 
Political stability (1-5)  .28 .27 
 
 (.40) (.42) 
Control variable    
Presence of federal system (0-1)   .90 
   (.51) 
Constant 4.10*** 3.35* 3.38* 
 
(.92) (1.41) (1.46) 
R square .26 .27 .27 
N 27 27 27 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors within parentheses. 
 
Evaluation of the model and analysis of the results. To begin with, each of the Model 1 
explains 26 % and each of the Models 2 and 3 explains 27 % (R square*100) of the variance 
in absorption of EU funds. There is a statistical significance at .01 level of F value in Model 
1. Also, in Model 1, the predicted value of Y (value at which the fitted line crosses the Y axis) 
is equal to 4.10, compared to 3.35 and 3.38 in Model 2 and 3 respectively. From the Beta 
value in Model 3 we see that quality of public institutions makes the strongest unique 
contribution to explaining the absorption of EU funds (Beta=0.46, while only 0.1 and 0.03 for 
the other two variables). Thus, only coefficients of public institutions variable reach 
statistically significant unique contributions to the equations. On the contrary, any other 
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variable does not show it. Most importantly, we can see that each additional increase in 
quality of public institutions raise absorption of EU funds by 0.59 in the scale. Here, high 
values of DfBetas and Standardised DfFit were checked and did not indicate any extreme 
cases (biased coefficients).  
 
According to the Part correlation coefficients we see how much of the total variance in 
absorption of EU funds is uniquely explained by each independent variable and by how much 
R squared would drop if it wasn’t included in the model. In Model 2, public institutions 
quality uniquely explains 17.3 % (0,416* 0.416*100) of the variance in total EU funds 
absorption rates, and 16.9 % (0.412*0,412*100) in Model 3.  
 
As it was only the Model 1 showing significant results, the following regression variables plot 
illustrates the relationship between the absorption of EU funding and the quality of public 
institutions, considering 2007-2013 programming period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 3. Regression variables plot (Model 1) 
 
Interaction term. The results of the OLS-regression, especially Model 2 which did not 
support the idea raised in theory that political stability also can explain absorption of the EU 
funds, raised a suspicion of indirect causal relationship, namely that political stability might 
have an impact on the relation between public institutions and absorption rates. To check this, 
an interaction term was introduced. 
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Table 3. The effect of political stability on the relation between public institutions and EU 
funds absorption 
DV: EU funds absorption rates (1-10) Model 1 Model 2 
  (bivariate) (with an  interaction term) 
Public institutions (1-7) .59** .79 
 
(.20) (.49) 
Public Institutions*Political stability 
 
.06 
  
(.49) 
Political stability (1-5) 
 
-.29 
  
(2.10) 
Constant 4.10*** 3.64 
 
(.92) (1.96) 
R square .26 .29 
N 27 27 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors within parentheses. 
 
Evaluating the model. Firstly, we see that Model 1 and 2 explains 26 % and 27 % 
respectively (R square*100), of the variance in absorption of EU funds. However, in a small 
sample like this it is better to check the adjusted R square instead of normal R square (which 
can overestimate the true value if a sample is rather small, according to Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2001). Then, we see that 23 % and 20 % is explained by model 1 and model 2 
respectively.  
 
Analysis of the results. The included interaction term did not make an expected change in the 
results of the second model in comparison to the first model. We can see that the values of 
public institutions coefficients increased, but lost statistical significance when interaction term 
was introduced. Indeed, there is no significant difference in the effect of public institutions 
quality on absorption of EU funds between more and less politically stable countries. The 
interaction term does not make a statistically significant unique contribution to the prediction 
of EU funds absorption and we can say the same about the political stability variable.  
 
Summing up, a null hypothesis was denied and, most importantly, concrete result was 
reached, namely that quality of public institutions reaches statistical significance and makes 
the strongest unique contribution to explaining the absorption of EU funds, and each 
additional increase in quality of public institutions raise absorption of EU funds by 0.59 in 
the scale, given absorption rates on the overall 2007-2013 assistance period. 
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5. What impact does EU Funds assistance absorbed possibly 
have on the quality of public institutions? 
 
On the other hand, it is clear that the relationship between EU regional and cohesion aid 
,absorbed via the EU co-funded projects, and quality of institutions is twofold, meaning that 
not only public institutions affect the absorption of the EU Funds, but EU Funds absorbed can 
also have various effects on institutions, as discussed in part 2.5. Accordingly, the effect can 
be positive, negative or neutral, but also it can vary depending on a sector to which EU Funds 
are transferred. However, only one study has gone deeper to analyze this relationship and 
found negative effect in some of the less developed EU Member States (Eastern and Central 
Europe): a quantitative research analyzing a large-scale public procurement database by 
Fazekas et al (2013). A study has indicated several factors related to promotion of 
institutionalized grand corruption in chosen countries. Since this is the most recent research 
which produced convincing results, it was decided to conduct informant interviews using 
factors indicated by Fazekas et al (2013) as some of the variables.  
 
Considering data given by European Commission on regional and cohesion funding, there is a 
possibility to see for what sectors in each country EU Funds were allocated and how much of 
it was absorbed, but there is not much of the qualitative explanation on the outcomes. More 
specifically, that data has a limited potential of explaining how exactly the money spent 
contributed to further development and cohesion, and what other implications did financial 
assistance have. Indeed, there are many forms of feedback and reports collected by the EU 
Funds managing agencies, as well as information on media as a part of required publicity of 
each project, however it is collected from people who have a direct interest to give as positive 
feedback as possible, because no funding can be given for projects proven to be unsuccessful 
or having bad implications. It is therefore highly important to increase the number of 
independent research on this topic. 
 
Accordingly, to answer an open question what impact does EU financial assistance absorbed 
possibly have on the quality of public institutions in Europe, the following approach is 
chosen. 
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5.1. Method 
 
I believe that the most appropriate way forward for answering the second research question is 
a qualitative approach, with help of which it is possible to test theories represented in 2.5. part 
on this study’s empirical data (Hesse-Biber, 2011). To do that, semi-structured interviews 
with professionals from one of EU Member States who are/have been working with EU-
funded projects were conducted. Interviewees are selected from organizations in several 
sectors (business and import development, social welfare/education, IT, public relations) 
which were participating in public procurement competitions under EU-funded projects, as 
well as some people working in one of the local institutions managing EU regional and 
cohesion programmes and projects.  
 
Semi-structured interviews guarantee more flexibility and interaction between expert and 
interviewer, also act as a reasonable tool for collecting more details and aspects undiscovered 
in theory yet. Also, it allows interviewees to express their thoughts in a free manner and leves 
space for explaining the answers. This is highly important considering the sensitivity of the 
topic. Some interviews were conducted by meeting selected professionals directly, others by 
skype conversation. Results bring both good and bad practice to the daylight and compare 
experience in different sectors, to fulfil the need for multiple sources of evidence. Interviews 
helped to fulfill the ambition to generate new theory through research data and to capture 
findings that reach beyond the previously discussed theory.  
 
Interview questions were designed considering the main indicators of institutionalized grand 
corruption in public procurement competitions phase of the EU-funded projects (Fazekas et 
al, 2013). With reference to the discussion held in part 1.4.1, there are three of them: 1) 
Limiting the set of bidders (in the submission phase); 2) Unfairly assessing bidders: (in the 
assessment phase); and 3) Ex-post modifying conditions of performance (in the delivery 
phase). Nevertheless, the interview questions are more explicit and additional questions based 
on theory were introduced naturally from one interview to another, depending on things 
discussed. This was done also to make discussion more interactive and to understand if 
aspects of EU funded projects and their public procurement can act as good variables 
explaining variation in institutional quality. List of questions is to be found in the Annex 2. 
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5.2. Case selection and data 
 
Lithuania is chosen as an area of inquiry due to several factors. First of all, a strong factor 
motivating to choose this country for analysis is my own professional experience in 
Lithuania, where I was working as a Projects Manager in a company offering assistance for 
preparation of project proposals to get EU funding as well as it also participated in public 
procurement competitions under various projects co-financed by EU. Then, I was directly 
observing some aspects in the interaction between the EU Funds assistance projects and 
institutions that I believe need to be captured and analyzed deeper. In addition to that, as a 
member of Lithuanian Project Management Association (LPVA) I was able to invite 
interviewees needed more easily.   
 
Despite that, this country catches an eye while analyzing to what extent quality of public 
institutions matter for the absorption of EU Funds assistance, where together with Greece, 
Portugal and Estonia it is one of the EU Funds absorption leaders (78,8% rate) while scoring 
below average on the institutional quality. Also, in the recent report of the Economist on the 
10
th
 anniversary of joining the EU Lithuania showed the greatest change in GDP per person 
compared to all the other countries which joined EU in 2004 as well. It means that there are 
factors other than institutional quality affecting the absorption of EU Funds and steady growth 
of GDP per person. Similarly, EU Funds can also have undiscovered angles of impact on the 
institutional quality, other than it is already captured by Fazekas et al (2013) in some of the 
Central and Eastern European countries, namely Slovakia, Hungary and Czech Republic. 
 
At the same time, the Lithuanian case matches the rationale of a typical case as the chosen 
case is an example of EU Member State among others and could therefore serve as an 
example of how EU-funded projects affect the quality of public institutions. One drawback in 
this case is the transferability of these results. Also, the method chosen is itself criticized for 
its inability to make generalizations as the conclusions are drawn from very limited number of 
cases (Geddes, 2003), so a larger analysis could be needed in order to apply the analytical 
findings to other countries foreseen to be similar enough to Lithuania. It is however 
noteworthy that two of the aid absorption leaders in 2007-2013 were Baltic countries 
(Lithuania and Estonia), what implies that this case study has a potential of explaining a 
36 
 
phenomenon of this region on a given question. Given all that, this case study is expected to 
be capable to explore possible effects that EU-funded projects have on quality of institutional 
framework. 
 
Empirical data is drawn from 9 interviews with local (Lithuanian) experts, namely project 
managers who are/have been working with EU funded projects and have/had duties related to 
public procurement. Even though gender is not a factor to take into consideration, it may be 
interesting to know that there are five woman and four men interviewed. Four of these experts 
were chosen due to their experience and position held and another five showed interest to 
participate themselves, after receiving an invitation for interviewees sent by email to all of the 
LPVA members. Although one of these people (infrastructure project manager) refused to 
participate in the discussion after receiving preliminary questions, one respondent was 
recommended by LPVA members. This recommendation is a process we could call a “snow-
ball” effect. The following table represents informants’ profiles. 
 
Table 4. Profiles of the interviewees  
 
Sector of expertise Referred 
to as 
Profile of the informant (company / activities) Years of 
expertise 
Business and import 
development / consultancy 
   
 A Project Manager at Enterprise Lithuania, business 
and exports promoting agency in Lithuania, which is 
sometimes issuing contracts via public procurement. 
This specialist has been previously working at 
Projektų Vadybos Institutas, a private company 
supplying various institutions and public 
organizations, mainly related to education and social 
welfare. 
2.5 
 B A consultant project manager for preparing proposals 
and administrating EU funded projects at one of the 
biggest business consultancy firms in Baltics. Full 
anonymousness is given to this informant. 
2 
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Lithuanian Business 
Support Agency (LVPA)
11
  
   
 C LVPA - Project Manager for Energy Sector 4 
 D A former Project Manager at LVPA who worked with 
business development projects (such as business 
management systems installation) and implementing 
management methods, quality management 
certification (ISO), also certificating products. 
3 
IT products and 
infrastructure 
   
 E A Project Manager at Alna Software, company 
focused on IT projects production and 
implementation. Around 80% of this firm’s clients 
are government organizations. 
4 
 F Computer equipment and maintenance, electronic 
systems manufacture and development firm, majority 
of which clients are public institutions as well. For 
this respondent full anonymity was guaranteed, 
therefore company name again is known only for 
researcher. 
 
7 
Social welfare / education    
 G A freelance project manager, who has previously 
worked at Projektų Vadybos Institutas, a company 
which was mentioned by one of the previous experts. 
3.5 
 H A Project Manager at IT company which is not 
implementing EU-funded projects, but specialist has 
previous experience in educational sector projects 
funded by EU, namely a private college Vilniaus 
Kooperacijos Kolegija (3 years) and in IT sector 
projects supported from EU Funds (1 year). 
4 
                                                          
11
 one of the agencies disbursing EU Funds in Lithuania For the scheme of EU Funds administrating institutions 
in Lithuania, visit http://www.esparama.lt/administravimo-sistema  
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Public relations    
 I A Project Manager at public relations and strategic 
communications firm  BVRG Burson-Marsteller 
7 
 
Experience of specialists varied from 2 to 7 years. One could argue that less than 5 years of 
expertise is arguably little. Nevertheless, even after two years of experience in a field one 
already has an understanding of the processes happening, as well as witnesses the “rules of 
work”, yet is still critical and conscious enough as not soaked into the treadmill, so speaking 
about details of work does not become uncomfortable yet. It felt exactly this way when 
talking to younger professionals, whereas the older ones were a bit more apathetic, more 
worried about interview’s anonymousness due to the placement they have, and not willing to 
share details about the “underground waters” until full anonymousness was guaranteed.  
 
Length of the interviews was 40 minutes on average, shortest being approximately 25 
minutes and the longest one exceeding 1.5 hour. Four of the interviews were done via skype 
video conference (as interviewees’ and my location differed: most of the people were in 
Lithuania, one in United States, and I was in Sweden) and these discussions were recorded by 
special software with possibility to store files in mp3 format for later transcription. Another 
five were held by meeting experts “tête-à-tête” in Lithuanian capital Vilnius, and taking notes. 
As both I and interviewees had Lithuanian as a mother tongue, language of all the interviews 
was Lithuanian. It has minimized the possibility of misunderstandings due to language 
barrier, however I had to translate every word to English what was in risk of 
misinterpretation. As soon as possible interviews were transcribed in order to capture all the 
impressions that might fade away if time between interview and transcription is too long. 
Also, only one interview was transcribed at once, to remain concentrated and be able to find 
insights and make comparisons on points discussed in the previous interviews. This helped 
for analysis to flow more smoothly as well.  
 
Unfortunately, semi-structured interviews never guarantee full honesty of participants, but for 
collecting facts and capturing unique experience from the field it is still a reliable approach. It 
also felt different interviewing people who held the same position for more than 5 years 
compared to people talking about the workplaces they already left. These seemed to be less 
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afraid to talk about sensitive aspects of this topic and have less direct personal interest of 
giving non-truthful answers; by guaranteeing full anonymousness for some of informants this 
problem was reduced. Additional factor encouraging people to speak openly about sensitive 
aspects was their willingness to contribute to possible change by this independent research, to 
add publicity for the rooted practice in the field and just to speak up and express their 
thoughts based on experience in the field. 
 
5.3. Analysis and Results 
 
As there were specialists from several different sectors interviewed, analysis of questions has 
a comparative manner where possible. In order to begin interviews and proceed to discussion, 
some general questions were asked about expert’s perception of  EU Funds projects; later 
more elaborative questions followed, that were meant to discuss the possible impacts on 
institutional qualities, and also to discuss the aspects of EU supported projects public 
procurement. Specialists are often quoted here to improve the reliability of findings. 
How would you describe your general opinion about EU-funded projects in Lithuania? 
What evidence do you have for that? 
 
Asked to express opinion about EU Funded projects respondents were convinced that they 
were and are very beneficial to Lithuania, hence some experts critically pointed that even 
though ES funded projects do their job, money lacks being spent efficiently. Views on this 
question were very similar regardless the sector, it was only the examples that varied. 
 
For instance, (G) noticed that intellectual property in Lithuania increased as there were many 
projects to develop teachers´ and other professionals´ competence. As it was said by (B), 
business market has grown, “More consultants, more suppliers, automatically more business 
development and more workplaces.” Likewise, experts interviewed discussed increased 
requirements for implementing new management methods, standards such as ISO in 
organizations, also attention to impact for environment. “Institutions such as Ministry of 
Environment ask for certain certificates related to good environment practice, to reduce 
harm for environment.” (F).  
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Other respondents talked about economic benefits of these projects as well: “One simple 
thing is that EU funded projects helped Lithuania to stand on its own feet.” Same was noticed 
in IT sector and infrastructure: “Lithuanian budget itself would not be able to invest in 
development of IT and other infrastructure so well”. (E)  
 
Nevertheless, there were more critical views expressed by (F): “EU funded projects bring 
benefit only until organizations think about the future while spending money. But around 80% 
of them in Lithuania don’t do that, and here is where the problem comes from”. This 
comment was given talking about public procurement of firm´s clients that are public 
organizations. Accordingly, we could say that some institutions lack strategies ahead and 
orientation to future, what requires more critical assessment from institutions involved in EU 
Funds administration, as they are meant to guide behavior of individuals and organizations 
working on EU funded projects.  
 
There were also more global aspects of EU assistance discussed by (D): “<…>EU funded 
projects initiate changes. They create an impulse to act, to do something new, to search for 
new solutions. The drawback is that there still are organizations and companies that just want 
to get and then diverse funds without any focus on product.” Then, respondent pointed to 
some problems causing this, namely that such a behavior is a matter of people’s mentality, 
which I not easy to change just as other collective action problems. Expert concluded that 
having more strict “rules of the game” and control of institutions indeed does a slow, but 
constant positive change in Lithuania.  
 
Generally, respondents agreed that EU funded projects have high control which minimizes 
lawlessness, however some experts were more skeptical on this matter and spoke about some 
specific problems they noticed: “Talking about back sides… That is a fact that forms of 
corruption exist within EU Funded projects. It is like a public secret: everyone knows it. And 
it exists in all EU.” (G) Corruption is a sign of impartiality which is essential determinant of 
institutional quality. Therefore, it is very important to undercover if there are more impacts of 
such a kind on institutions, and if it is somehow related to EU assistance. This leads us to 
analysis of the next question. 
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Have you ever thought of/noticed any effects EU-funded projects have for the 
institutional framework in a country? Examples: corruption, organized crime, or maybe on 
the contrary: better development of institutions in order to be able to manage EU funded 
projects, other positive/negative experience. 
Would you say that some sectors are more prone to be affected this way? Why? 
 
Some specialists firstly made a comparison between public and private institutions 
development during the years of EU assistance, and the overall manner of working. Based on 
experience of (D): “Business and its’ institutions have faster reaction and adaptability to 
changes <…> whereas in Ministries and other public institutions there are still many 
problems with responsibility. <…> Search for responsible ones takes time and this is a 
problem that there are no exact people assigned to take the final decision.” 
 
On an institutional level some respondents did not notice big development due to practice of 
outsourcing external specialists for projects: “<…>There were many institutions and public 
organizations that had nice and smooth projects implementation, but did not develop 
themselves. For example “Education Development Center”, I wouldn’t say that there were 
new competences developed at this public organization, <…> there were many external 
freelance specialists employed to deal with projects and they were gone after a certain 
project was over, leaving institution with the same level of development as before.”(G).  
 
Same specialist also made comparisons between the size of projects. “I can guarantee 100 % 
that the bigger the budget and the greater support for the projects the more secret deals there 
are between organization and suppliers. It is like a public secret. <…> But the projects I 
worked with are not that big and therefore I think they are not prone to be affected that way.” 
(G)  This was interesting enough to hear, considering that director of the company where this 
specialist worked was going to unofficial meetings and paying the bribes to win public 
procurement competitions, according to interview with his ex-colleague, informant (A). 
 
Although it was the majority of respondents who felt that the greater the budget for a projects, 
the higher the risk of funds diversion, (H) expressed different view on that: “Even with small 
projects under 30 000 euros  corruption exist, I have seen and witnessed it myself. But in the 
bigger projects, were money is even more seductive, situation is even more intense.”  
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Nevertheless, the majority of specialists pointed to building and infrastructure sectors that 
may have more “underground waters” while working with EU contributions. An expert (B) 
who worked as a consultant interested only to win the administration of EU funded projects 
and preparation of analytical parts, but also helped with some preparation for public 
procurement, has witnessed interesting processes: “In building projects <…> they want 
someone specific to win, who could build cheaper than it is stated in the documents, as 
budgets are huge; and to divide the rest of money between themselves. <…> I have witnessed 
the project owner calling to some supplier and willing to meet in another town as it was risky 
to speak about it by phone.” The collision of public and private organizations in networks 
based on favoritism is known as legal corruption (Kaufman and Vicente, 2005), leading to 
appropriation of public power for private gain in a ways that do necessary obey the official 
legislations. Example given was illustrating the presence of such a practice in Lithuania. 
 
Another example on building sector was given by (C). “We go to an object which is has 
already been built. We see that there are many mistakes done by builder. But it is Technical 
Supervision that is responsible for that. And we, seeing those mistakes cannot do anything: 
neither to deny the certificate, nor apply penalties then. We can only inform the Ministry of 
Environment about someone doing a bad quality work, the Ministry who actually also cannot 
do anything”, indicating limited power of legal framework to punish companies for low 
quality of outcomes. 
 
In addition to these aspects, there was a link between how much of the project is co-financed 
and diversion of funds identified. As a case of the point, (B) said: “When 100 % is financed 
by EU it is like a dessert for some organizations. The cases of cheating that I have seen is in 
first of all infrastructure, and secondly when the percentage of EU support is greater, namely 
90 % and more. And so consequently it happens mostly in public sector, as I haven’t seen 
that business getting more than 60 % support.” Expert specified that business development 
projects as the ones co-financed from LVPA (Lithuanian Business Support Agency) 
administrated EU Funds usually receive 50% assistance and another half is covered by a 
project owner, so then there is less motivation for project owner and supplier agree to increase 
prices without logical explanation, as it automatically increases the part project owner has to 
co-finance. Interestingly enough, the only specialist who refused to participate in interview 
after reading the preliminary questions was the one from infrastructure sector. 
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There was an expert (C) interviewed from LVPA as well, who confirmed that greater 
assistance is reducing responsibility for efficiency of spending money and likewise increasing 
the rent seeking activities in public and semi-public organizations. There was also another 
example given related to building sector. ”Those cases when almost 100% funding is given, if 
we talk about renovation, energy sector, make changes in market. There is not such a big 
motivation to find the most effective offer, as it will however be covered. Prices are made 
greater by suppliers, some pre-agreements and other games occur. Usually it is still perfect 
on the paper and hard to proof any deflections. Whereas those who have for example 50 % 
funding are more eager to find better price and performance combination, more oriented to 
quality.” (C) 
 
To support the link found under this question of the interview, namely between greater 
funding and motivation to diverse funds, number of recent studies indicate that any 
integration is not a space neutral process leading to Pareto efficient outcomes as it may lead to 
a serious relocation of resources, wealth and income (Cuadro-Roura and Parellada, 2002; 
Puga, 2002; Barrios and Strobl, 2005; Kallioras and Petrakos, 2010; Petrakos et al. 2012). As 
an illustration from one of the crisis-smitten countries, a senior Greek official in Brussels 
pointed to the controversial effect of the EU structural funds in Greece, even before the crisis: 
“The best thing the EU could do for Greece is to cut off the structural funds immediately; 
anybody who works hard at a regular business is regarded as an idiot, since it‘s much easier 
to set up a project to draw in European subsidies“. (The Economist, 2003). Similar point was 
also made by (G): “I am sure that when money comes not from the government‘s pocket, it is 
more “tasty money” then, especially for the big whales of business.” 
To make it more clear, there is some evidence that the EU support for projects encouraged 
public and private environment to concentrate on activities which possibly are in a higher risk 
of legal corruption. Taking into account the examples experts in Lithuania shared, it gets not 
that easy to argue that the more projects the EU support, the more it contributes to reaching 
social and economic development and cohesion. Hence, the main focus of this research part is 
to find more links between EU assistance and institutional quality in Member States, and so 
far there were not enough explicit examples on the impact on institutional environment 
discussed. Therefore, we move to the more specific questions. 
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From your experience, do EU-funded projects have positive, negative or none effect on 
these features of public and private institutions: impartiality / credibility / adaptability 
/ transparency / efficiency of legal framework and the bureaucracy ? 
 
Asked about these features, respondents´ opinion divided into two poles and answers varied 
to a large extent, not depending on sectors: 
1) One part agreed that financial support such as from EU Funds can push for mostly 
positive changes in public institutions.  
2) Another part argued that these features were not affected during the years of EU Funds 
assistance.  
Concluding discussions supporting the first opinion, respondents were very explicit 
explaining positive effects of EU support on public institutions. Many experts have witnessed 
institutional development, told that public sector is in a positive track due to more control and 
a need to improve its management and strategies. For instance, it was claimed that 
bureaucratic burden increased, but together with it bureaucratic apparatus also started 
developing due to great workload and lessons from the past mistakes, also as discussions on 
what could be better solution, how to minimize the burden appeared.  
 
According to (D), there is a high working tempo, great control and innovations in many of 
institutions administrating EU Funds. “Competences of people working really increased as at 
first there were experts hired who trained us on various aspects of administration and 
management. So, competences increased and increased a lot. I believe that if not EU funding 
there wouldn’t be for example boost of Lean Management culture. <…> That Lithuania is 
one of the leaders of EU funds absorption can be partly related to greater control, but there 
was also big rapidity and concentration what improved the competences of everyone 
involved.”  
 
Expert (H) also added, “Institutions really had developed new features in order to coordinate 
projects more successfully, for example new management systems were possible to 
implement”, giving examples of advanced document management, accounting systems and 
databases. Informant (B) believed that these factors initiate constant positive changes what 
can be interpreted as a reasonable effect on institutions’ adaptability, and that it is more 
significant than possible disadvantages, as there always is some drawback together with 
things that help to develop. 
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Another important aspect discussed was transparency. Respondents claimed that there are 
more initiatives to increase transparency of public sector, but it is still far from a perfect 
condition. Although it was argued that not only the EU co-financed projects and the control of 
EU institutions was a factor motivating improvement, but also because new generation of 
Lithuanians has a different mindset than the ones who grew up under communist regime of 
Soviet Union. 
Yet another case of the point expressed by interviewees was that additional control removes 
some of the partiality due to more checking and requirements, as EU co-financed projects are 
under a greater attention of authorities. As it was stated by (D), “From institutional side, the 
effect on impartiality only increased.” It was claimed by many specialists that effects on 
impartiality and credibility varies, depending on organizational culture of people working in 
institutions.  
 
On the contrary, views of another group of experts were much more skeptical, arguing that 
even though the number of projects and control on many levels has increased, but it left 
institutional features untouched:  “There were many projects for ministries and agencies, 
<...> municipalities and other institutions started rethinking their strategies, needs <…> 
more analysis of possible investments <…> But impartiality or similar things… It did not 
decrease or increase.” (ideas supported by C, F, H, I and D). Experts pointed to some 
examples such as that there was more financial support for people with disabilities, elderly, 
orphans, other sensitive social groups, what helped to decrease inequality and some sorts of 
imparity in Lithuania, but for impartiality of institutions there was no impact noticed.  
 
Asked about impartiality of institutions in EU funded projects environment, (C) explained 
that institutions disbursing and administrating EU funding are always impartial, as they do not 
have any additional interests. “About Ministries and similar institutions, it is hard to judge... 
If there are some underground waters, we cannot see them. If there are some agreements 
between public and private organizations or rent-seeking, we don’t know about them. If there 
are some political decisions, we don’t reach any information. <…> Talking about corruption 
in Lithuania, it didn’t decrease or increase, it stayed as it was before EU funded projects.”  
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Those who pointed that institutions did not change too much at all had the same opinion even 
when interview turned into questions related to corruption. For instance, (D) commented: “I 
would think that there was no effect of EU funded projects on a general corruption and 
similar issues. But I saw some possible favoritism, namely when public organizations had to 
choose suppliers.”  
 
Overall, there were only positive or none impact on institutional quality discussed. However, 
(C) raised an important detail about possibly adverse effect: “EU projects can be increasing 
corruption, but only those projects where organizations are issuing contracts via public 
procurement.” Expert explained that it is due to the public procurement legislations with 
many flaws and gaps which are very hard to control. It was stated that sometimes it is really 
visible that there are certain agreements between organization and suppliers, but in the 
documents one cannot find any evidence, as everything is made legally right. This is again 
pointing to the presence of legal corruption, which is sometimes impossible to capture 
referring to existing legislations. 
 
Given that part of the experts noticed no impact on impartiality, credibility, adaptability, 
transparency, efficiency of legal and bureaucratic framework, and another part found these 
characteristics improving, one could say that it is rather positive impact of EU assistance on 
institutional framework in general. However, there was a valuable argument made that public 
procurement under EU co-financed projects is likely to have a higher risk to effect institutions 
in a negative way, as for example encouraging legal corruption, thus decreasing impartiality 
as a main ingredient of institutional quality. This concern was discussed under the next 
question, based on the main findings of Fazekas et al (2013) in three Eastern European 
countries.  
 
While preparing public procurement proposals for organizations managing EU-funded 
projects, have you ever noticed (in the submission phase) that organizations calling for 
tenders: 
a. Have modified the call for tenders? 
b. Haven‘t published calls for tenders in an official journal? 
c. Were limiting the set of bidders by requirements that are possible to meet 
only by one company/person in all the country? 
Have you ever seen any forms of unfairly assessing bidders (ex., favoritism for a 
specific company) in the assessment phase? (If you worked in organization calling for 
tenders, have bidders tried to contact you offering unofficial meetings, etc.?) 
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Asked questions related to procurement, none of the experts interviewed have witnessed 
modification of the call for tenders, pointing to heavy regulations and monitoring. However, 
less than half of interviewees have noticed organizations or institutions calling for tenders 
limiting the time for proposals or not publishing calls in official journals. “With exception of 
some public procurement methods <…> all calls for tenders need to be published officially, 
but of course there are magazines and newspapers in which it is hard to find these calls if 
they are not put to the central public procurement information system (CVPIS)
12
. One could 
hide them actually even in that system. (G) 
 
Surprisingly, all the respondents claimed to have seen company calling for tenders setting 
requirements possible to meet by one supplier only, however some emphasized that these 
cases can be reasonable when very specific product is needed, also may be affected by 
experience of previously having unfair suppliers. As a case of the point, (F) commented: 
“Public organizations learned their lessons from suppliers, who made it through the 
procurement competition and then provided the lowest quality products from China. Some 
companies even manage to get proof from those Chinese that products meet the technical 
specifications even though they do not. <…> After such cases public organizations became 
more cautious and this is a natural thing that they are willing to work with firms they can 
trust, and that the service or product is meeting expectations, to not get a cat in a box.”  
 
Orientation towards quality is the justification of arguable favoritism for specific supplier that 
was heavily stressed by all the respondents; yet taking actions in favor for a specific supplier 
is absolutely against the principle of equal and unbiased competition. Still, this practice seems 
to be rooted in Lithuania, as (B) added: “I have spoken to many colleagues and they say that it 
is almost impossible to win any public procurement competitions that are not known in 
advance, regardless if they are under EU funded projects or not. Usually before procurement 
calls appear in CVPIS, potential suppliers are informed in advance and sometimes even 
help to prepare the procurement documents to make it easier to limit the set of bidders.” 
According to (B), this practice is the same not depending on EU projects presence, as it is 
affected by trusting certain firm’s service and quality in general. Moreover, (H) claimed to 
                                                          
12
 Central Public Procurement Information System, www.cvpis.lt 
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have seen companies agreeing in advance about prices: “It is both the bidders and 
organizations calling for tenders initiate that, but not necessary within one specific sector.” 
 
The more heavy practice of favoritism discussed by (B) was bringing attention to governing 
elite: “The real bad practice it when for example when there are big projects in 
municipalities, when interests of municipality board members arise.” A unique example of 
such incentives was given by (A):“In the competitions by Education Development Centre13 
one and the same company was constantly winning, because a person responsible for public 
procurement there had opened a private company (not on his name officially) and then 
influenced that company to win.”  
 
Specialist interviewed was working in that firm and has left a job after realizing machinations 
that occur there. According to (A), after getting enough experience for the company to be 
competitive for more projects than from Education Development Centre, many of which were 
actually co-financed by EU funds, the official quit job at institution. Expert (A) added: “While 
working there I saw official director forced to go and unofficially meet people from private 
organizations and institutions with money in an envelope.”  
 
One of the most important aspects pointed by one of the most experienced informant is 
prooving existence of legal corruption and a trend of high level polititians benefiting from 
public tendering: „I cannot say that some institutions are more developed and having 
different work principles. It is just politics. Our country`s politics. All these procurements 
arrive directly to politics. Politicians protect some firms. There were many cases when such 
firms were winning even though they had 7th place in competition, but then suddenly all the 
others are omitted for some reasons. But what can one do then? To complain that it is unfair? 
Such things are done legally; in documents you cannot find any unfairness.”(F) 
 
Potential favoritism and forms of legal corruption was noticed in public relations sector as 
well, as (I) told “I have suspicions of organizations being biased and unfair. There are even 
discussions in media about some agencies constantly winning for some institutions.” 
Additionally, as (H) had experience both in education/social welfare projects and IT, expert 
                                                          
13
 A state educational institution providing support for students, teachers and schools, www.upc.smm.lt  
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was able to comment on differences between these sectors: “In IT sector there were same 
pre-agreements in procurement as in social sector.” 
 
Despite these striking facts, majority of specialists emphasized the limited possibilities to find 
evidence of institutional and legal corruption, especially of the unfair assessment of bidders in 
public procurement. “What is the most annoying is that it is legally impossible to kick such 
companies away from the procurement as they know their rights and their documents usually 
are prepared perfectly. There is no obvious evidence of their actions”, (A) complained. 
Accordingly, (C) added that sometimes when it is visible from a human perspective that 
something is being agreed, or that results of projects are not according to the plan, it is 
nothing that can possibly be done, and not because it is missed from the outlook, but because 
documents are prepared without any misconduct one could find: “<…>Big transgressions 
are very hard to prove. <…> When some small and unexperienced organizations do mistakes 
in procurement because of lack of knowledge, we are applying financial corrections to them. 
They receive less funding than the services that they purchased cost. These are the ones I pity. 
And these are actually more frequent cases, because those who plan in advance some rent 
seeking activities, they usually know how to prepare perfect documents. Those who make 
more mistakes are usually the ones who just have no experience.” 
 
One specialist shared an example of limited responsibility for setting penalties for firms 
obeying the law. For instance, when institution was informed about certain violations of law, 
but did not take action to penalize the supplier. (A) was very open about experience in such a 
case, when institution did not react due to „lack of time“, as it was told. “<…>In the Ministry 
of Economy, there was an obvious violation in the procedures of public procurement once, 
but I was told that they don‘t have time to take care of that.” Expert explained that Ministry 
was procuring some services and her previous workplace (Projektų Vadybos Institutas, 
previously discussed for corrupt behavior), was winning the competition. Then it turned out 
expert’s CV was sent by that supplier with falsified signatures and without any permission. 
(A)`s friend working in the Ministry noticed it and asked if (A) was working in two 
companies or as a freelance specialist somewhere. “Then I have sent two official complaints 
to this Ministry saying that the bidder that was violating law. That supplier was at least 
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rejected in some way; first I was informed that they will put that case forward to their lawyers 
and finally I was told that they will keep them in mind as an unfair company, that’s all.” 
 
This brings us back to the Report on EU Integrity System (2014), which indicated similar 
processes in the high level of EU government, namely that: “The Commission has 
discretionary powers to exclude (or ‘debar’) companies for 'grave professional misconduct', 
yet only one was excluded for this reason at the time of writing. Moreover, only six entities 
were debarred for convictions of fraud, corruption, money-laundering or involvement in a 
criminal organisation, raising questions on how well member states and the Commission are 
sharing relevant information.” Again, if this practice is present in EU central institutions as 
well as every country, the fact of being unpunished for obeying the law can motivate further 
development of transgressions in all levels of public and private sector. 
  
Have you ever faced the ex-post modifying conditions of performance on the delivery 
phase by organization calling for tenders? (If you worked in organization implementing EU 
funded projects, then have you faced that agency managing corresponding EU Funds was 
modifying conditions of performance on the delivery phase?) 
 
There were no examples given on public organizations or institutions modifying conditions 
on the delivery phase. As it was expressed by interviewee (E), in Lithuania is the opposite – 
to change any details in agreement is nearly impossible, as the project owners are afraid to be 
penalized by EU Funds managing institutions. This was heavily criticized by (E), giving 
examples of IT sector projects where there may be certain useful corrections of IT solutions 
and infrastructure, that supplier could recommend. It is however usually impossible to change 
any conditions set in the call for public procurement, as everything needs to be implemented 
without any change. “Due to very big CPVA control, nobody is willing to get into conflict with 
institution, so technical specifications are being changed only in veeery rare cases when 
production according to those specifications is really impossible. <…> Everything became more 
strict during recent years. Some years ago it was possible to reason and implement some small 
changes due to better solution, now at least our clients don’t risk getting into trouble and arguing 
with CPVA; the production just follows the description. Now their position is very strict.” (E) 
 
On one hand this practice can be understood as forced inflexibility of institutions issuing calls 
for tenders and being not incentive-compactible, but given that public spending needs strict 
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rules to avoid rent seeking, an improvement in control by EU funding disbursing agency 
witness positive changes. 
 
Discussing this question, (H) was the only one to point to some controversial facts regarding 
the attitude of one of EU Funds administrating institution. First, expert noticed that Lithuania 
is one of the top countries with very high EU funds absorption rates which can be 
consequence of the scheme public organizations issuing contracts via procurement are using 
for increasing the prices. Then, interviewee explained that while working with structural 
funds aid and implementation of EU supported projects not only in terms of procurement, and 
was working a lot with ESFA (European Social Fund Agency); agency was requiring and 
asking to spend all the money allocated, because absorption of money means that later agency 
will not have to give the unspent budget back to the EU budget, as well as in the next funding 
periods country will not have many difficulties to get more money as they are successful in 
using them. Expert emphasized: “I believe Lithuanian EU Funds absorption is good really 
not due to machinations, corruption in public procurement, or at least not due to that only, 
but also because institutions controlling funds are encouraging and pushing organizations 
to absorb as much as possible.” The expert gave an example of educational trainings 
organized. Under this activity there was some budget left, and then “college was asked by the 
agency to organize one more, additional training session to absorb the money that was 
planned for this project. Neither was it due to corruption nor was it public procurement 
issues, but due to willingness to absorb more money allocated.”  
 
Asked about similar practice of being encouraged to modify the scope of project spending 
when less money is spent compared to what was planned in the beginning, other specialists 
claimed to not have experienced it. (B) commented, that it is absolutely unlikely that similar 
practice is present in EU funds administrating institutions, as the ones he was in contact with 
(LPVA, CPVA, NMA) are very strict and usually encouraging to spend money in the most 
efficient way and even asking to save some if possible, as saved money would still be 
possible to issue new calls for projects. (B) also described differences between Funds 
administrating institutions: “I haven’t heard of agencies, at least not from LVPA any 
encouragements to spend all allocated even though where is nothing else to do with the 
projects, I would say that at least LVPA and CVPA has a principle of saving money if 
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possible, not spending more. <…> If money is saved then Lithuania doesn’t lose money, 
agency just issues calls for new, additional projects.”  
 
Here, there was an example given on how institutions administrating EU Funds may 
encourage project owners to spend more money and increase absorption. On one hand, it is 
understandable, as the greater absorption the possible is a goal of every Member State. On the 
other hand it can serve as an example of increased wastefulness of public money spending, in 
cases when project goals are reached without spending all budget allocated. Hence, it is 
arguable if example given about more educational trainings is pointing to it, as additional 
education as an output did not benefit anyone else than the target group of the projects. There 
is still more evidence that strict behavior of the majority of EU Funds managing institutions 
lead to a positive trend of decreasing lawlessness and incentives for rent-seeking in public and 
private sector. It is however unclear if this and other aspects discussed so far differ compared 
to projects funded by government itself. 
 
Would you say that (arguable) partiality/legal corruption in public procurement is 
specifically related to the framework of EU-funded projects, or would it be the same 
regardless the existence of EU-funded projects? 
 
The goal of the qualitative part of this study is to capture the possible effect of specifically EU 
funded projects via their procurement nuances, but one has to be cautions and not forget that 
things as public tendering existed far before EU funded projects came, consequently the EU 
supported projects’ effect can be influenced by the overall trend of “doing business” in a 
given country. If that was a case, it would be tough to argue that the impact of EU-funded 
projects discussed with informants is authentically coming from the EU funded projects 
compared to ordinary projects in a given country.  
 
Here, the majority of respondents claimed there was negative opinion created by media in 
society, and an impression that only procurement under EU funded projects is related to 
corrupt behavior or increasing it, whereas it happens as often as from ordinary procurement 
by public organizations. The only difference identified by majority of informants was only the 
greater control.  
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“Comparing projects funded by EU and not funded by EU there are more control 
mechanisms. It is we, institutions administrating EU funds, also government control 
watchdogs such as Public Procurement Office. And of course European Auditors Court and 
similar institutions on EU level. It may not catch all the transgressors, but there is a great 
attempt to do it.” (C) 
 
Discussing this question, many pointed to the overall problem of public procurement 
legislation, its` gaps and flaws, and local government settings. As it was expressed by (H), 
“Procurement existed far before EU supported projects started, and then due to their 
publicity there were more talks and scandals, and people got a vision that corruption and 
other bad governance practice is only related to those projects, but in reality one has to look 
to a wider picture, our government is using money in the same, if not even in more unfair 
ways. <...> Some institutions might have experienced corruption and other forms of 
impartiality, but most of them tightened themselves up and started working more as they 
should. I cannot say how was it in other sectors, but in social, competences development 
sector it was like that.” Accordingly, the majority of interviewees felt constant positive 
changes in the Lithuanian institutional setting regardless the EU assistance. 
 
“It is really not the case that with EU funded projects people found new ways to cheat. If the 
EU support would end there will still be the same problems, just less money for good projects. 
However there is no difference if money came from EU or country’ budget, the only 
difference for business is the profit they can have and source of income does not matter.” (B) 
 
“All we discussed is just an overall trend in public procurement, in my opinion ES supported 
projects do not accumulate more of this. They are just put into an ongoing trend.” (A) 
 
Surprisingly, this view was also expressed by both specialists who had 7 years of experience 
(one in IT, another in public relations). As stated by (I):“There is no difference between 
procurement under EU financed projects and without, it is absolutely the same process, 
laws and settings. All procurement is the same.”  
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Then, (F) added striking fact based on experience: “When I started working in IT 15 years 
ago, there were people running with bags full of money to politicians; same thing is 
nowadays, just there is more money. It became a usual working method. Firms are changing, 
but owners are the same.” This quote strikingly reminds the beginning of Kaufmann and 
Vicente (2005) paper on legal corruption, and supports the same view: “The menus change, 
the presidents change. What never changes is the dinner guests”14 
 
Discussing this question, (C) was one who have noticed the great difference between projects 
funded by EU and not, stressing the change of attitude toward project and its budget. ”There 
is immeasurable difference between projects from EU Funds and from other sources. The 
essential thing is that when one is buying for own money, there is more interest in maximum 
benefit. Free money makes no difference. Then, one is also buying, but the price does not hurt 
and does not make big difference. Should one have renovated the school for a million when 
the real cost was 800 thousand or 900 thousand Litas, there is no difference for the project 
owner, because it is not his own money then. And it is a fact that for the EU funded projects 
law does not change, but the attitude towards project changes.”  
 
Summing up, the majority of informants were convinced that legal corruption and other 
activities leading to decrease of public institutions’ quality are a general problem in 
Lithuanian institutions, and this practice was just successfully adapted by some EU funded 
projects owners due to different attitude towards “free money” and accordingly less 
motivation to be incentive-compactible. There were still significant examples given of 
positive changes in institutional framework in Lithuania during the recent years, what could 
also be explained by high EU Funds absorption rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 According to Kaufnamm and Vicente, it was originally extracted from Luis Moreno Ocampo, “En defensa Propia, Cómo 
salir de la corrupción”, Editorial Sudamericana, 1993 
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Additional matters of concern  
Concluding what has been discussed, all professionals shared thoughts about what is fueling 
the situation and how it can be changed. They referred mainly to collective action problems 
that exist in Lithuania, aspects related to social capital, as well as the generation which has 
been previously raised under communist regime, where involvement in practices lowering the 
institutional quality was inevitable; it was mentioned by all the respondents.  
 
„The attitude is related to mentality I believe. Many understandings are left from Soviet times, 
older people still believe that without envelopes they cannot do anything. And I believe 
thinking of people have to change. New generation has really less of that in their heads.”(A)  
 
“Of course, it is moving slowly to a better side, but with old methods, it is a fact that 
corruption and pre-agreements are present and maybe even a few more generations are 
needed to change it, to change the overall mindset and attitude of people. So far the old 
generation is still alive and have raised children in such a setting.<…> If people could be 
able to change the attitude and understanding about such a things, then the attitude towards 
all projects and spending would also change.” (C) 
 
For improvements, there were suggestions to revise the public procurement law, increase 
transparency and publicity, also to increase the financial burden for project owners and 
minimize the extent of EU co-financing. To illustrate, (C) shared insights regarding possible 
pushes for change: 
 
“<...>There needs to be more penalties and more publicity. <…>If there was more publicity, 
I believe people would be more conscious and afraid of being caught. And fear is a thing 
which could bring more order, <…>Now, it is too easy to not get caught, too much 
tolerance for unfair behavior. Not only in public procurement, in all the areas. A lot of 
publicity with heavy penalties would make also doctors, builders as well as public 
procurement specialists think before taking a bribe. When we will stop talking and start 
taking action, we will see changes in the consequences.” 
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More than half of the experts stressed that if bad practice was more public, making effect on 
company’s or institution’s image, potential shame and disgrace could initiate all institutions to 
think more before taking the high risk. Unfortunately, nowadays even on the central EU 
institutions level “information on debarred companies is not made public, reducing the 
potential deterrent effect of ‘naming and shaming’ offenders”. (EU Integrity System report, 
2014) 
 
To make it more clear, many experts pointed to problems within information related to EU 
funded projects management. Interviewee (A) told that there is a lack of publicity that does 
not allow to judge if some institutions are doing better than the others “I don’t know much 
about other institutions, maybe due to a lack of publicity. <…> Information is hard to find 
and usually barely comprehensible even for professionals.”  
 
According to (C): “It is very rare that media would gladly write about projects that have been 
implemented, about services or products that were purchased cheaper, unless it is a part of 
required publicity measures for which media is paid.” 
 
It can be partly explained by changes in media market, that were also confirmed by (I): “It is 
impossible to get services from media for free. When they see that it is financed by EU you 
always pay because you need to use EU support logo. To spread the info about nice initiatives 
for free therefore is impossible.” As a case of the point, Nevinskaite (2009) represented how 
projects financed by EU structural funds have reinforced the tendency in the local media to 
expect public institutions and companies to pay for publications instead of relying on ethical 
relationships with project owners in Lithuania. 
 
These additional findings were extracted by going beyond micro interactions to wider social 
structures, conditions and consequences and brought attention to problems related to 
information management of EU funded projects, what have adverse effect on publicity and 
transparency of public sector.  
 
Looking more specifically to the results of these discussions, many problems identified here 
point to the accustomed manners based on which public and private sector interact with each 
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other. It is however noteworthy that legal corruption in EU co-financed projects is present and 
reaching highest government bodies, including politicians and public officials with their 
incentives to benefit from using their power to support certain firms participating in public 
procurement competitions; although it was argued that EU funded projects are just disgorged 
into the ongoing trend of the overall tendencies of the overall public procurement. Thus, there 
is also a positive perspective on current and future development of public institutions quality 
drawn by many informants, stressing the changes that higher control of EU Funds projects 
implementation have already brought, and the changing mindset of citizens. Unfortunately, 
there is no evidence that these positive changes are strong enough to limit the legal corruption 
and other processes demolishing quality of public institutions; basically due to flaws in law, 
lack of publicity and efficient penalties. 
 
Low institutional quality limits the absorptive capacity of EU Funds, thus one can say that 
institutional quality in Lithuania should have increased during the last years. Hence, there still 
are many imperfections in general institutional framework that require further considerations 
and investments. The quality of public institutions in turn implies that there is greater 
effectiveness of EU funds assistance, which can be successfully translated into further 
development and cohesion.  
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6. Concluding discussion  
 
Overall, the results of this study contribute to much deeper understanding of the twofold 
relationship between absorption of the EU Funds assistance and the quality of public 
institutions in the Member States.  
 
Using the most recent data, significance of the public institutions quality for greater 
absorption of EU Funds was estimated, revealing that each additional increase in quality of 
public institutions was raising absorption of EU funds by 0.59 in the scale. It confirmed that 
institutional component is a foundation-stone for EU Funds absorption, given the significant 
influence of public institutions quality variable for the EU Funds absorption in 2007-2013 
period, although it is not the only important aspect (as it was noted in theory, macroeconomic 
and financial factors matter as well). Results of this thesis support previous institutionally 
oriented research which provided a broad circle of evidence of the importance of institutions 
for development of recipient countries. Yet in EU perspective it is also noteworthy that only 
2.9 billion euros out of 347 billion euros of total funding for Regional and Cohesion policy in 
2007-2013 was spent on this important objective
15
, which is so important for development of 
public institutions. How such a self-neglect can be explained is another matter of concern, 
however the results imply that institutional quality should be given more attention in the 
process of managing and implementing EU Structural and Cohesion programmes, in order to 
foster the absorption of EU financial commitments what are meant to bring more convergence 
to the region.  
 
And further, by answering the second research question impact which EU financial assistance 
absorbed via EU-supported projects possibly has on the quality of public institutions in 
Europe was analyzed, bringing diverse examples. With all the respect to the positive influence 
on institutional quality discussed (less lawlessness, development of new competences and 
management systems, etc.), there is also evidence found that legal corruption in EU co-
financed projects is present and reaching highest government bodies, including politicians and 
public officials with their incentives to benefit from influencing outcomes of public tendering 
competitions; although it was argued that EU funded projects are just disgorged into the 
ongoing trend of the overall tendencies in the public procurement. It is thus arguable if the 
                                                          
15 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/thefunds/funding/index_en.cfm  
59 
 
positive effects on institutional development discussed are steady and strong enough to be 
capable of overcoming and limiting the legal corruption and other processes demolishing 
quality of public institutions in the long term. The main reasons to that being flaws in law, 
lack of publicity and lack of efficient penalties, three aspects that are in a strong need to be 
revised by EU government. Given the aspects discussed in light of second research question, 
EU should consider tailoring financial support with stronger mechanisms of monitoring, 
control, penalizing and publicity, all focusing on qualitative assessment of products and 
services procured under EU co-financed projects. It is also each country’s own responsibility 
to guarantee that the money absorbed do not create an “EU aid curse”, but given that in some 
countries legal corruption and rent seeking is reaching the high level of politics, EU should 
also act as a more influential watcher. Another track is even to contemplate alternative ways 
for enhancing the prosperity levels in EU, founded on different policies and approaches.  
 
Certainly, taking into account institutional conditions in every EU Member State and 
establishing consistent strategy on how institutional quality can be improved is an inevitable 
element for any development to be successful, especially talking about such extensive 
programmes as from EU Structural and Cohesion policies. 
 
Bringing focus on the research methods used in this study, there are several directions for the 
future research. As a first path, similar quantitative study could be more valuable if a time-
series data was used for regressions, namely comparing the OLS-regressions results from the 
funding period 2007-2013 and previous periods, to see how great the change was. 
Institutional quality variable could also be broken down to separate determinants, to find out 
which of them are the most significant for the equation. Talking about the qualitative analysis, 
the results from informant interviews have limited transferability; hence, findings support the 
previous research on the topic and bring new aspects into the light. One of these is an aspect 
revealed that business market is also affected by the EU co-financed projects, and it may be 
that in the long term institutions started to corrode due to the market distortion in the first 
place. To test and accept or reject this suspicion, a new and deeper analysis would be needed. 
This thesis also has a potential to encourage further research on the same topic, especially the 
quantitative research in every Member State, similar to what was already done in Hungary, 
Czech Republic and Slovakia by Fazekas et al (2013).  
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Overall results of this study stress that Member States need high quality of public institutions 
in order to absorb EU Funds more efficiently, thus fostering growth on national levels and 
real convergence in EU. The challenging task posed by the context of this thesis is for EU 
authorities to avoid the possible negative implications of EU Funds assistance on quality of 
public institutions, which can paradoxically lead to the European “aid curse” in Member 
States, and consequently derangement instead of development. With a fresh start of new EU 
funding period 2014-2020 and given the growing euroscepticism in the EU, it is essential to 
revise the management of EU public money, yet changes should first of all start from the 
central EU institutions’ level.  
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Annexes 
 
 
Annex 1. Descriptive statistics and diagnostics 
 
Frequency distribution statistics of the DV: EU Funds absorption, recoded 
 
Statistics 
FundsAbsorpt_rc   
N Valid 27 
Missing 0 
Mean 6,7359 
Std. Error of Mean ,19313 
Median 6,9800 
Mode 4,52a 
Std. Deviation 1,00353 
Variance 1,007 
Skewness -,418 
Std. Error of Skewness ,448 
Kurtosis -,335 
Std. Error of Kurtosis ,872 
Range 3,93 
Minimum 4,52 
Maximum 8,45 
Sum 181,87 
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown 
 
 
Standartized normal probability (P-p) plot 
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Extreme cases of the DV: EU Funds absorption 
 
 Case Number Country Value 
FundsAbsorpt_rc Highest 1 7 Estonia 8,45 
2 21 Portuga 8,35 
3 11 Greece 7,93 
4 16 Lithuan 7,88 
5 8 Finland 7,64 
Lowest 1 22 Romania 4,52 
2 3 Bulgari 5,22 
3 18 Malta 5,24 
4 23 Slovaki 5,28 
5 14 Italy 5,43 
 
 
Collinearity Statistics.  
DV: EU funds absorption rate (1-10) 
  Tolerance VIF 
Public Institutions .801 1.250 
Political Stability .799 1.248 
Federal system .927 1.078 
      
 
Correlations between DV and IVs 
 
 FundsAbsorpt_rc PublicInstitutions PS_rec Federal0_1 
Pearson Correlation FundsAbsorpt_rc 1,000 ,505 ,134 ,018 
PublicInstitutions ,505 1,000 ,568 ,149 
PS_rec ,134 ,568 1,000 ,210 
Federal0_1 ,018 ,149 ,210 1,000 
Sig. (1-tailed) FundsAbsorpt_rc . ,004 ,253 ,465 
PublicInstitutions ,004 . ,007 ,229 
PS_rec ,253 ,007 . ,146 
Federal0_1 ,465 ,229 ,146 . 
N FundsAbsorpt_rc 27 27 27 27 
PublicInstitutions 27 27 27 27 
PS_rec 27 27 27 27 
Federal0_1 27 27 27 27 
 
69 
 
  
70 
 
Annex 2. Interview questions 
 
General part: 
1. Your name, age? 
2. Name of a company you are working/worked for and its` business sector? 
3. Your position held and years of experience with EU-funded projects? 
4. How would you describe your general opinion about EU-funded projects in Lithuania? What evidence do 
you have for that? 
5. Have you ever thought of/noticed any effects EU-funded projects have for the institutional framework in a 
country? Examples: corruption, organized crime, or maybe on the contrary: better development of 
institutions in order to be able to manage EU funded projects, other positive/negative experience. 
6. Would you say that some sectors are more prone to be affected this way? Why? 
7. From your experience, do EU-funded projects have positive, negative or none effect on these features of 
public and private institutions: impartiality / credibility / adaptability / transparency / efficiency of legal 
framework and the bureaucracy? 
More specific questions (based on findings of Fazekas et al (2013)): 
8. When preparing public procurement proposals for organizations managing EU-funded projects, have you 
ever noticed (in the submission phase) that organizations calling for tenders: 
a. Haven‘t published calls for tenders in an official journal? 
b. Have modified the call for tenders? 
c. Were limiting the set of bidders by requirements that are possible to meet only by one 
company/person in all the country? 
 
9. Have you ever seen any forms of unfairly assessing bidders (ex., favoritism for a specific company) in the 
assessment phase? (If you worked in organization calling for tenders, have bidders tried to contact you 
offering unofficial meetings, etc.?) 
 
10. Have you ever faced the ex-post modifying conditions of performance on the delivery phase by organization 
calling for tenders? (If you worked in organization implementing EU funded projects, then have you faced 
that agency managing corresponding EU Funds was modifying conditions of performance on the delivery 
phase?) 
 
11. Would you say that (arguable) partiality/corruption in public procurement is related specifically to the 
framework of EU-funded projects, or it would be the same regardless the presence of EU-funded projects? 
 
 
